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INTRODUCTION - FEMINIST LITERARY CRITICISM 
One of the most persistently productive and researched areas of contemporary feminist 
theory is that of literature and literary criticism. From Simone de Beauvoir's incorporation of 
an analysis of five authors in the theoretical section of Le Deuxieme Sexe (Montherlant, D.H. 
Lawrence, Claudel, Breton and Stendahl) to Shulamith Firestone's examination of the would-be 
"object ive" portrayers of the male/female experience (Herbert Gold, Malamud, Updike, etc.), 
literature has been seen to play an integral part in the understanding of women's position in 
society. Kate Millet organized Sexual Politics around an analysis of the mysogyny revealed in 
the novels of Henry Miller, Norman Mailer and D.H. Lawrence while the examples provided by 
literature form an important part of her argument in Germaine Greer's The Female Eunuch. 
Significantly, both these writers were specialists in literature, the latter lecturing in English at 
Warwick University. It was these books which accompanied the development and grov/th of the 
women's liberation movement at the end of the sixties {Le Deuxieme Sexe although translated 
in 1953 was not issued in paperback until much later). A noticeable feature of these books which 
have become almost classics in the field of feminist theory, was the attempt to reach a com-
prehensive picture of the condition of women, not only from a subjective viewpoint but f rom 
an objective historical, sociological, political, economic and literary point of view as well. Le 
Deuxieme Sexe provided a prototype for this kind of approach, the first part being an objective 
analysis of the condition of women, the second part being a subjective description of the ways 
in which women experience that condition. It is no wonder that the critics had d i f f icu l ty in 
comprehending this work when it was published, expressing both bewilderment and a begrudging 
awe at the sheer bulk, complexity and wealth of detail of this work. They were understandably 
confused at the compelling yet conflicting arguments, the reasoning which was both detached 
and impassioned, and above all the revelation of something that seemed obvious but had never-
theless been hitherto unrecognized. It is both a strength and a weakness of Le Deuxieme Sexe 
that it attempted such a comprehensive view of women's oppression, the weakness deriving from 
the fact that de Beauvoir had to base many of her assertions on scanty evidence, much of it 
biased while at the same time being unclear as to the nature or the extent of the situation that 
she was defining. She herself acknowledges that she has di f f icul ty in articulating the question 
she is seeking the answer for: "D'ailleurs y a-t-il un probleme? Et que! est-il? Y-a-t-il meme 
des femmes?"' De Beauvoir merely expressed the feeling which confronted many of the pioneers 
of the women's movement. Betty Friedan even entitled the first chapter of her The Feminine 
Mystique "The problem that has no name". It was the novelty and the diffuseness of the prob-
lem which lead these theorists to cast the ambit of their enquiries so wide. 
1 
Literary criticism which had been an important element in the earlier theoretical analyses 
of women's condition as a whole, later became an activity in its own right. Feminist literary 
journals, articles and books abounded. However, along with the fragmentation and increasing 
specialization of the specific areas of feminist theory has come a certain remoteness of the parts 
from the original whole of a comprehensive and coherent view of the condition of women. 
This process is reflected in the composition of women's studies courses in universities: at first 
women's studies courses tended to be inderdisciplinary and radical in the sense that they chal-
lenged the traditional concepts of the purpose and methods of academic courses. But as time 
went on, they retreated into individual departments to work on feminist approaches to the 
traditional specialized disciplines. In the field of literary criticism one can observe an analogous 
process. At first, feminists attempted to make literary criticism into part of an encyclopaedic 
feminist theory using a rough-and-ready dialectical method of a movement to and fro between 
the text, the author and the society in which the work originated. This approach was due partly 
to a reaction against the prevalent hegemony of formalist criticism which by refusing to engage 
in any extrinsic method was felt to be a useless and elitist pastime, largely irrelevant to the 
comprehension of a society in which the students of the time were highly critical of the prevail-
ing values. In the general criticism of authority and established values the current approaches 
to literary criticism were also questioned. As one American feminist put it at the time: ". . . the 
majority of literary critics and professors in the United States desparately believe that there is 
no relationship between art and life which allows them to study literature as a privately created 
world completely independent of its social and political context".^ It was found that the 
methods and criteria of the standard type of criticism taught in universities were inadequate 
for understanding a novel like Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar, which although technically imperfect 
was yet felt to be extraordinarily relevant to hundreds of thousands of women college students 
who had shared the same experience as Esther Greenwood. It was in this general climate that 
feminist criticism originated. Kate Millet was one of the original exemplars; she formulated her 
approach in the following terms: 
It has been my conviction that the adventure of literary criticism is not restricted to a duti-
ful round of adulation, but is capable of seizing upon the larger insights which literature 
affords into the life it describes, or interprets, or even distorts . . . I have operated on the 
premise that there is room for a criticism which takes into account the larger cultural 
context in which literature is conceived and produced. Criticism which originates from 
literary history is too limited in scope to do this; criticism which originates in aesthetic 
considerations, "New Criticism", never wished to do so.^ 
Much of the work which has subsequently appeared on women and literature has taken for 
granted the importance of "the larger cultural context in which literature is conceived and 
produced". In a survey of this early work made by Cheri Register, it becomes apparent that there 
were three stages in the development of feminist criticism in America."^ Firstly, there was the 
examination of works of literature, often literature written by men, searching for the kind of 
stereotypes of women contained in them. Perhaps the best and most representative of this type 
of criticism is Mary Ellman's Thinking about Women.^ Secondly, in an effort analogous to the 
feminist historians" attempts to recover the lost history of women, feminist literary critics began 
to look at the works of women writers who had previously been undervalued, misinterpreted, 
ignored or forgotten. As a result of this activity writers like Kate Chopin, Dorothy Richardson 
and Jean Rhys were "rediscovered". The rediscovery of women writers and the definition of a 
female literary tradition was accompanied by the question of whether different critical assump-
tions should be brought to the analysis of women's work, given the manifest prejudice and 
inadequacy of "male" criticism. On this question there were two main schools of opinion. The 
first, represented by critics like Patricia Meyer Spacks believed that "a special female self-aware-
ness emerges through literature in every period". Spacks framed the questions around which she 
organised her research as: 
What are the ways of female feeling, the modes of responding, that persist despite social 
change? Do any characteristic patterns of self-perception shape the creative expression of 
women?^ 
The second school of thought was uneasy about the notion of a "female imagination" concerned 
that this type of approach would encourage the idea of innate sexual difference. As Elaine 
Showalter put it: 
The theory of a female sensibility revealing itself in an imaginary form specific to women 
always runs dangerously close to reiterating the familiar stereotypes. It also suggests per-
manence, a deep, basic, and inevitable difference between male and female ways of per-
ceiving the world.'' 
There is a danger in this method of creating, or rather reinforcing the existing literary apartheid 
where, in Ellman's words "women cannot comprehend male books, men cannot tolerate female 
books. . . there must always be two literatures like two public toilets, one for Men and one 
for Women".® 
The third phase in the development of feminist literary criticism is the emergence of a 
method of criticism which can be employed to establish the function of literary criticism in the 
movement for liberation. One of the most complex questions that has arisen has been the prob-
lem of determining whether new feminist writing should try to reflect the actual situation of 
women or whether it should try to provide positive role models to help women in their efforts 
towards self-actualization. This is a problem directly comparable to that which faced Marxist 
literary critics in the nineteen-twenties and thirties who debated whether literature should only 
reflect reality or whether it should try to change that reality by influencing it in the direction 
of socialism. 
In response to this dilemma, recent articles in feminist literary journals have voiced a need 
for feminist critics to concern themselves more with a theoretical grounding to their criticism. 
In the Canadian journal "A Room of One's Own", Constance Rooke suggests that the initial 
enthusiasm and righteous anger which inspired the movement to identify the sexism which per-
vaded both literary texts and the established canons of criticism, may have gone too far without 
examining its own assumptions. While the initial enthusiasm was valuable for reinvigorating 
literary studies with a new sense of relevance and purpose, she suggests that this enthusiasm may 
have had its day and may even become professionally hazardous.^ 
Another danger, as I see it, in this somewhat directionless surge of feminist literary criti-
cism, is that unless there is a constant reiteration of the theoretical premises upon which this 
criticism is based, however rudimentary this may be, it may lose contact with the practical 
activity of the feminist movement and become an isolated academic discipline. There has to be 
a continual recognition and restatement of a commitment to the principles of literature's radical 
connection with society and the usefulness of criticism. There is a distinct possibility that in 
ignoring or forgetting these basic principles feminist literary criticism will be "co-opted" by 
the "system". The fear of these priorities for this purpose should still have the discipline in the 
forfront possibility is expressed by Carole Ferrier in an article in the journal Hecate: "any 
feminist criticism that is not part of a general critique of our social system is likely to float off 
into a consciousness raising that is not very far removed from the glorification of "human 
nature" in which most conservative literary criticism is grounded".' ° 
In order to sustain its momentum, feminist literary criticism has to go back and re-examine 
its original impulses, particularly Millet's notion of the political nature of literature and the 
rejection of formalism. On rereading, it is apparent that these principles were reached more or 
less spontaneously - that is, as a response to the immediate situation rather than as a result of a 
lengthy theoretical process. Formalism was rejected because it was the prevailing critical doc-
trine at the time and was found to be wanting; the political nature of literature became obvious 
when the political nature of the socially determined sexual division of labour was articulated 
and the hitherto concealed, or rather unrecognized, sexist content of literature and literary cri-
ticism was revealed. But there seems to be little indication that these insights were not new, or 
that there had been a whole tradition of literary criticism based on these postulates which had 
been suppressed, ignored and discredited in America after the war. Fraya Katz-Stoker's article 
is one of the few which does draw attention to the school of Marxist criticism of the thirties. 
She cites a number of influential critical works from this period, including those of Christopher 
Caudwell, V .K. Parrington, Granville Hicks, John Strachey and Ralph Fox. She goes on to suggest 
that this tradition was suppressed during the McCarthy era to whom the usurping school of 
"New Criticism" owed its ascendency: 
The history of criticism in the United States is intimately bound up in the history of poli-
tics. Not only did New Criticism rise wi th and support the reactionism of the past twenty-
five years, it reflects the thoroughness wi th which anti-communism and anti-Sovietism have 
penetrated even literary studies. It has become standard literary procedure to decry the 
tyranny of social realism in socialist countries but no one seems to see the mirror effect 
in this country . At the same time when formalism became the majority artistic heresy in 
the Soviet sphere, a non-formalist crit ic (eyen worse if he were a Marxist) became a dead 
person in American academic circles. Some, like Edmund Wilson, recanted, and some, 
like Margaret Schlauch, left the c o u n t r y . ' ' 
In her opinion, it was only wi th the bir th of the seventies that " l i terary criticism has awakened 
f rom a hypnot ic trance which was self-induced shortly after the Russo-German pact and the 
outbreak of war in 1939." It is not surprising then that feminist literary criticism should appear 
to start f rom scratch. In the late 1960's in America, as in Great Britain and Australia, most of 
the Marxist critics who wrote in English were all but forgotten, or, like Arnold Kett le, ostracized, 
while the European critics like Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin and Goldmann were only just being 
translated. Sartre was perhaps the best known figure, although less as a crit ic than as a philo-
sopher. Hegelian criticism, as opposed to the Soviet tradit ion, was relatively unknown in the 
English speaking wor ld, so much so, that Frederic Jameson who introduced some of the new 
European critics to America was able to say of the Marxist criticism then known that it was of 
"a relatively untheoretical, essentially didactic nature, defined more for the use of the night 
school than in the graduate seminar. . ^ 
It may be that the negative response and sometimes open hosti l i ty displayed by left wing 
groups towards the women's movement engendered a distrust among feminists of much Marxist 
dogma, including Marxist literary criticism. Certainly, feminism has learnt to look at Marxism 
wi th a critical eye and to cast doubts about the value of socialist theory for the liberation of 
women. This guardedness has combined wi th the inclination of some feminists towards the re-
jection of all male ideology and the construction of a feminist theory de initio, so that the 
contr ibut ion that Marxist literary theory could make to feminist theory has not yet been ful ly 
realized. It is my opinion that, in Simone de Beauvoir's words, " just as the proletariat makes its 
own use of the heritage of the past, so women must take over the tools forged by men and use 
them for their own interests. . . what is called for is a revision, not a repudiation, of know-
ledge."* ^ This is particularly true in the case of Marxist literary criticism which has had a long 
tradi t ion of dealing wi th almost identical questions to those being posed by feminist critics 
today — such as the relation of literature to the individuual's experience of society, the role of 
literature in the development of a revolutionary theory and consciousness, how to deal wi th 
literature of the past in the light of future goals, and so on. Feminism has in common wi th 
Marxism that they are both theories which describe and determine the struggles of men and 
women to free themselves from exploitat ion and oppression. 
It is therefore my intention in this thesis to demonstrate that feminist literary criticism 
can benefit from a kind of holistic approach proposed by Marxist theory which takes into 
account the structural and ideological composition of the society from which women's litera-
ture, both in the particular and the general, originates. 
Departing from a Marxist analysis of the organisation of the relations of production in 
capitalist social formations which assign to particular social groups more or less exclusive and 
well-defined functions according to sexual identity, I hope to demonstrate that these relations 
of production are maintained principally by ideology, reinforced in the final instance by the 
repressive violence of the state apparatus. 
The ideology which defines the role and status assigned to women in the relations of pro-
duction and the various material forms in which that ideology is manifested are essential factors 
In the shaping of women's literature. Not only do these forces affect the external circumstances 
surrounding female literary production, but also they have a profound influence upon the very 
nature and composition of that literature. I will further argue that the hostility shown towards 
women's work in literature is a result of women's literary career aspirations being in conflict 
with the ideological forces which determine the relations of production. Moreover, the general 
opposition to female literary production, combined with their social and economic circum-
stances, conspired to make women writers as a group more vulnerable to being co-opted by 
capitalist methods of production, with profound and often negative effects on the quality and 
content of their writing. 
Most of my literary data comes from nineteenth century England not only because this 
period is often regarded as the classical era of women's literature, but also because this was the 
period in which women entered the literary profession as they never had before, a fact which 
coincided with, and was to some extent a result of, the rapid development of the material means 
of the mass production of literature. At the same time, the ideological division of labour and 
the subjection of women assumed their starkest and most contradictory aspect in this era. The 
analysis is still very relevant to our own day, however, since many of the circumstances that 
shaped women's literature then still exist today. Just as importantly, contemporary women 
writers are seen, and see themselves as often as not as writing within a female literary tradition, 
the lineaments of which were sketched out in this early Victorian period. 
RULING CLASS A N D RULING IDEAS 
The most important theoretical premise f rom which to start is that of dialectical materia-
lism. This is the fundamental principle of Marxist criticism f rom the earliest fragments of com-
ments on literature by Marx and Engels, through to the Hegelian aesthetics of Lukacs. The 
principles of dialectical materialism were elaborated in a condensed form in Marx's preface to >4 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definate relations, 
which are independent of their wi l l , namely relations of production appropriate to a given 
stage in the development of their material forces of production. The to ta l i ty of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which arises a legal and political super-structure and to which correspond definate forms 
of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determine their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.' 
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It is these principles which form the foundation of Marxist criticism's argument that a writer's 
work cannot be comprehended if the crit ic remains on the level of what he wrote, of the isolated 
text, or even of the literary tradit ion to which he belonged. To do so would be to abstract the 
work f rom the material context of its genesis and thus deprive the critique of any success in 
reaching beyond a superficial comprehension of its meaning. The justifications for this point 
of view are simple and have been reiterated to the point of tedium: writers, like all human 
beings are social creatures — they live in society, they enter into relationships w i th others, they 
are formed by, and in turn form their society. That society is, so to speak, the raw material 
of the work of literature. This simple t ru th was expressed with dry humour by Trotsky in his 
criticism of the Russian formalists who tried to diminish the significance of the social nature 
of art by exaggerating its individuality: 
No one can jump beyond himself. Even the ravings of an insane person contain nothing 
that the sick man had not received f rom the outside world . . . Artistic creation, of course, 
is not a raving, though it is also a reflection, a changing and a transformation of reality in 
accordance wi th the peculiar laws of art. However fantastic art may be, it cannot have at 
its disposal any other material except that which is given to it by the world of three dimen-
sions and by the narrower world of class society.' ^ 
Trotsky's phrase " the peculiar laws of a r t " is significant here because it is an indication of the 
complexi ty of the relationship between the work of art and the social situation of its origins. 
The connection between the work of literature and the concrete social relations of the author's 
environment are not direct, but are "mediated" by ideologies in which the author participates. 
The ideologies are of course derived f rom the economically determined structure of social rela-
tions. Ideologies consist of definite, historically relative ways of living in the world and of inter-
preting reality which both explain and justify the way societies are structured. This brings us to 
the second theoretical premise upon which Marxist literary criticism is based: that the class that 
controls the means of production also maintains an ideological hegemony over the whole society. 
Marx and Engels stated this idea most succinctly in The German Ideology. 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the 
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class 
which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time 
over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of 
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are 
nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the domi-
nant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the 
one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.' ^ 
Thus every society and every class within that society has an ideology appropriate to it which 
is determined by the ruling class. The ruling class will naturally construct an ideology which 
serves to enhance, consolidate or maintain their power derived from the monopolization of 
economic opportunities, and the concomitant status, exclusiveness and privileges that they 
enjoy. To do this, the ruling class develops a scheme of values and ideas that upholds their own 
behaviour and condemns that of the other classes. By their monopoly on the means of mental 
production the ruling class both consciously and unconsciously imposes a mental framework 
on society through which the existing relations and values that are historically relative appear 
to be universal and absolute truths. The concept of ideology has been defined best in its general 
sense as "systematically distorted knowledge".^ 
One of the methods of this "systematic distortion of knowledge" is to abstract knowledge 
from its object in the real world and to reify it. This means to disregard the changing, develop-
ing nature of reality and to hypostatize a historically determined moment of it into a universal 
and absolute truth. Associated with this process is the fragmentation of the knowledge of the 
totality of reality into partial and isolated pieces. This is part of the process of specialization 
inherent in the capitalist system of production. Specialization of the whole field of knowledge 
into compartmentalized disciplines prevents a knowledge of the whole which would include the 
knowledge of the operations of ideology, the class structure and the relativity of knowledge 
itself. Georg Lukacs calls these fragments of knowledge "fetishistic categories": 
For the function of these fetishistic forms is to make capitalist society appear suprahistoric, 
and a real knowledge of the objective character of phenomena, a knowledge of their historic 
character and actual function in the totality of society, forms an undivided act of know-
ledge.i® 
Thus the only valid method of understanding reality is to regard it as a "concrete totality", 
thus seeing the interrelationship of all the hitherto isolated facts. To understand an ideology it 
is necessary to determine the state of relations between different classes in society and then in 
turn analysing the relation of these various classes to the mode of production. 
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Literature is not identical with ideology, but it is related to it. Ideology, in the more parti-
cular sense used by Louis Althusser, is the "lived" relation between men and their world, or a 
reflected form of this unconscious relation, for instance "philosophy". This means that ideology 
is the imaginary way in which the real world is experienced, and in this way ideology is related 
by nature of its operation to literature. Both are imaginary means of experiencing the real world. 
The relevance of the analysis of ideology to the question of feminist literary criticism is 
immediately apparent when we consider the attention given to the ideological apparatus which 
is responsible for the maintenance of the sex-role stereotypes. Images of women in fiction, in 
the media, in education have been exposed for their function in imposing and perpetuating these 
stereotypes. Kate Millet encapsulated the extent and nature of the ideological component in the 
sexual class structuring of society in her theory of sexual politics: 
Sexual politics obtains consent through the 'socialization' of both sexes to basic patri-
archal politics with regard to temperament, role, and status. As to status, a pervasive assent 
to the prejudice of male superiority guarantees superior status in the male, inferior in the 
female. The first item, temperament, involves the formation of human personality along 
stereotyped lines of sex category ('masculine' and 'feminine'), based on the needs and values 
of the dominant group and dictated by what its members cherish in themselves and find 
convenient in subordinates: aggression, intelligence, force and efficacy in the male; pas-
sivity, ignorance, docility, "virtue", and ineffectuality in the female. This is complemented 
by a second factor, sex role, which decrees a consonant and highly elaborate code of con-
duct, gesture and attitude for each sex. In terms of activity, sex role assigns domestic ser-
vice and attendance upon infants to the female, the rest of human achievement, interest and 
ambition to the male.^  ^ 
The existence of a complex network of forces that maintain an ideology of the sex/class division 
seems clear; after ten years under the attack of feminism, the ideology of "the feminine mys-
tique" has undergone a defensive change, become somewhat camouflaged, but is still as essen-
tially strong as ever. In order to understand the operation of this ideology and the necessity for 
its endurance under the capitalist formation we must discover what it does that makes it so essen-
tial to the smooth persistence of the economic system it serves. To investigate the "feminine 
mystique" as an isolated fact without relating it to the economic structure of society can only 
lead to the fetishistic forms of knowledge that Lukacs condemned. In the same way, feminist 
literary criticism to which an analysis of the ideology of sexism is an essential prerequisite has to 
develop a knowledge of the whole organic composite of society in which that ideology operates. 
We must ask ourselves what precisely are the relations of the classes and sexes to each other and 
to the means of production? What is the structural function of women's ascribed role in the 
conditions of production? 
THE REPRODUCTION OF THE FORCES OF PRODUCTION 
When the oppression of women is considered f rom a historical materialist approach, its 
integral funct ion in the capitalist system of production becomes clear. It can be seen that under 
capitalism women have two important functions, all linked to the notion of reproduction. They 
are: (1) the physical reproduction of the forces of production, i.e. labour power, f i rst ly through 
the maintenance of the worker through domestic labour in the home and secondly through the 
biological reproduction of the workforce of the future; (2) the reproduction of the relations of 
production through ideology. The distr ibution of these functions is socially variable, but never-
theless broadly applicable to all women. While working class women generally perform all the 
tasks in the reproductive funct ion herself, often in conjunction with a job in the paid labour 
force, middle class women may employ and supervise others to perform all the reproductive 
tasks but the actual propagation of children. Nevertheless, her role is still a reproductive one in 
that she does not contribute directly to the creation of surplus value. Moreover, when women 
do enter the workforce themselves, they customarily f ind that their jobs are merely extensions 
of their domestic tasks, cleaning, catering, teaching, nursing, hairdressing, secretarial work , etc.; 
in other words, reproductive tasks. The sexual division of labour is off icial ly sanctioned and thus 
for practical purposes, enforced, by a wide spectrum of legislation such as taxation laws, welfare 
laws, etc., which effectively curtail the capacity of women to be economically independent. 
The importance of the notion of reproduction is stressed in Louis Althusser's essay, 
" Ideology and the State", where he observes: "As Marx said, every child knows that a social 
formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same t ime as it produced 
would not last a year. The ultimate condit ion of production is therefore the reproduction of the 
conditions of product ion."^ ° 
It must be emphasized that reproduction is the ultimate condit ion of product ion, and that 
it is the fundamental nature of this funct ion that belongs principally to women that accounts 
for the intransigence of sexual discrimination in the face of feminist pressure for change. The 
division of labour along sex lines is an essential element of capitalism's continued existence. 
In order to exist, every society must necessarily reproduce the conditions of its product ion 
in two forms: the productive forces and the existing relations of production. The reproduction 
of each of these categories involves two aspects, material reproduction and ideological repro-
duct ion. 
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The Materia! Reproduction of the Forces of Production: Labour Power 
A central concept for the material reproduction of labour-power is Marx's labour theory 
of value, a theory which is itself at the very heart of Marx's whole system. For Marx, labour-
power is a commodity like any other which is sold at a price, the price being constituted in the 
form of wages. Like any other commodity the price of labour-power is equal to the amount of 
labour expended to create it in the first place. It is part of the general mystification of wages 
that while the labourer believes that the money he receives after a full day's work is equivalent 
to the value of the labour-power that he has expended when in fact he need only have worked 
part of the day to obtain the value of his subsistence — the value of the reproduction and main-
tenance of his labour-power — the rest of the working day being spent on creating value over 
and above that of his subsistence for the benefit of the employer, i.e. surplus value. This is be-
cause bourgeois economics sees the sale of labour-power as the sale of labour, thus obscuring 
the fact that the wage represents the cost of producing the labour-power in the first place. This 
conceptual obfuscation of the real object of the transaction between the labourer and the capita-
list is directly responsible for the obscurity of the fact that labour is expended on the production 
of the worker's labour-power before he even enters into the bargain with the employer. The 
labour expended on the production of labour-power is that performed by women in the home. 
A certain portion of the wage is spent on commodities essential to life (housing, food, clothing, 
etc.), but then these commodities have to be transformed by the labour of the housewife (clean-
ing, cooking, laundry, etc.). Thus through the labour that the housewife expends on the com-
modities necessary for maintaining the worker's life as well as her own life so that she can 
continue to perform her reproductive function, domestic labour becomes a part of the mass of 
past labour congealed in labour-power. Domestic labour creates value (both use-value and ex-
change-value) when the labourer enters into the labour market in order to exchange his labour-
power for the means of subsistence, thus renewing the cycle. The value the domestic labourer 
creates is equivalent to the "production costs" of her own maintenance. Thus domestic labour 
performed by women is an integral part of the market production basis of capitalist society. 
" . . . behind every factory, behind every school, behind every office or mine is the hidden work 
of millions of women who have consumed their life, their labour-power, in producing the labour-
power that works that factory, school, office or mine."^ ^ 
The non-recognition of domestic labour derives from an examination of two consequences 
that flow from the indirect relation of domestic labour with the creation of surplus value — that 
raison d'etre of capitalism: the privatization and the technologically and economically backward 
nature of labour performed in the home. Because domestic labour does not contribute directly 
to the creation of surplus-value, it is not seen as real labour and thus appears to have no value 
in monetary terms, receiving no direct remuneration. The subsistence of the worker's family is 
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considered as an integral part of the wage and the wife is entirely dependent on the goodwill 
of her husband to give her part of his paypacket for the purchase of the comnnodities necessary 
for their combined existence. His earning of the wage in productive labour gives the husband 
(or father) the authority to control its use. The "unreal" quality of domestic labour has a dialec-
tical relationship with the mystification of the wage system. The belief that the worker sells his 
labour rather than his labour-power, combines with the hidden nature of domestic labour (per-
formed within the home, out of sight) in the reproduction of that labour-power, and contributes 
to the endurance of the mystification of the wage system. Similarly, because of the apparently 
indirect relation of domestic labour to capitalism and the production of value, this sphere of 
labour has remained more or less unaffected by the increasing rationalization and technical 
efficiency of industry. In industrial production any increase in productivity per man-hour creates 
a proportional amount of surplus-value, and thus an effort to raise productivity is an imperative 
for the expansion of capital, expansion being the sine qua non of the system. It is not so in the 
home where the organization of labour remains relatively unchanged and technological develop-
ment in the form of "labour-saving" appliances tend to intensify and diversify the scope of 
housework, if it is the woman's sole occupation — in accordance with the well-known "Peter 
Principle". 
The separation of labour into a domestic and an industrial sphere, the former reproducing 
the labour-power required by the latter, is the social basis upon which capitalism is built. In 
pre-capitalist social formations the family was organized as a self-sufficient economic unit in 
which production and consumption were undifferentiated. The sexual division of labour was 
determined by concrete activity rather than by specific roles in a market mechanism. Both men 
and women produced for immediate consumption as well as a surplus for exchange. Women 
were not confined to a role of reproduction as opposed to production as is the case in the capita-
list model, but were engaged in production in a much more important way inasmuch as their 
production was of a secondary, more advanced nature: women tended to take the tasks that 
converted raw materials into finished products, such as spinning and weaving. It was activities 
of this kind that produced a surplus for the social unit. The assumption of these very manufactur-
ing tasks by nascent industry at the beginning of the industrial revolution simultaneously de-
prived women of their status as producers. The development of capitalism was predicated on the 
destruction of these economically self-sufficient units, so that the population of labourers had to 
rely on the sale of the only commodity they had left to sell - their labour-power. Their depen-
dence on wage-labour led to a split in the hitherto united complex of production and consump-
tion. The men now spent their labour-power in the production of surplus, while women hence-
forth became confined to the sphere of consumption in the role of reproducers of labour-power. 
At the same time, we see a hardening of the ideology which prescribes roles and and functions 
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according to gender and the categorization of certain tasks as "women's work" with increasingly 
pejorative overtones. The role of women as consumers, the apotheosis of which Betty Friedan 
describes in The Feminine Mystique, is yet another reason for the devaluation of domestic labour 
whilst at the same time it serves to reinforce the isolated and privatized nature of women's 
activity. 
The large component of unproductive labour in domestic work (that is, labour not contri-
buting directly to the creation of surplus-value) has an important consequence when women 
become part of the general work-force. The dominant ideological model for sex-determined 
functions in capitalist society places women in non-productive situations in the home. In reality, 
* 
a large number of women do work outside the home. [^^ g development of technology 
and its profitable application to the unproductive labour performed in the home, many women 
are drawn into social labour in the service areas, which cater for the needs of a society in which 
the increasing standards of luxury expand consumption. 
The ambivalent nature of women's participation in the work-force ensures that their work is 
generally accorded a low status and low reward while they constitute a large proportion of the 
unskilled and part-time workforce. The unreal quality of domestic labour, the dependence on 
the husband's wage and the isolation of the nuclear-style home render women's unemployment 
invisible, thus cushioning the impact of capitalist crises. 
This point leads us on to ask why the nuclear family and women's privatized domestic 
labour persists in advanced capitalism — at least so far as it is the ideological norm. Women's 
role in cushioning capitalist crises is one, but also, in their domestic labouring capacity, women 
bear the brunt of the hardship felt by the proletariat during economic recessions. The quantity 
and quality of the means of subsistence required for the reproduction of labour power remains 
more or less constant, while the ability of the wage to purchase the necessary commodities is 
sometimes inadequate, in this situation the woman is required to work harder in order to close 
the gap between the inadequate wage and the needs of the reproduction of her husband's labour-
power. She meets these needs by producing commodities herself that she would formerly have 
bought. In fact, it could be argued that the domestic labour of women keeps the minimum wage 
to a level below the actual amount necessary to the subsistence of the working class and thus 
contributes to an increase of the surplus-value. This is also one reason why the socialization of 
• See Appendix, Table 1, 8 and 9 
•See Appendix, Table 2 
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childcare and housework has been unattractive to capitalisnn despite the potential increase in 
consumption and surplus-value resulting from the routine participation of all women in the 
labour market, because these benefits would be offset by the increase in the subsistence level 
and hence the value of labour-power. 
The pressure felt by housewives when there is a reduction in the real buying-power of 
wages and their role in the reproduction of their husbands' labour-power also works in capital's 
favour in another way. During industrial disputes women suffer from the cessation of the hus-
band's wage much more directly since the onus is upon them to maintain the house and family. 
Thus women have an interest in short-term solutions to disputes between workers and employers 
as against the long-term strategies of the unions. Women can play a conservative and compromiz-
ing role which ultimately acts in capitalism's favour. The dependence of the workers' has always 
been encouraged by bourgeois ideology which sets great store by family values and domestic 
virtues, an ideology that has its unwitting counterpart in proletarian sexism: to be able to say 
that one's wife has no need to work is a mark of status and success in many capitalist societies. 
In a footnote to his article, "The Housewife and her Labour under Capitalism," Wally 
Secombe claims that the housewife is intensely oppressed within the nuclear family under capita-
lism but that she is not exploited. She is not exploited because, according to Secombe, "surplus 
value is not extracted from her labour".^ ^ However, as we have seen, domestic labour is variable 
in terms of intensity and duration, and any amount of labour extracted over and above that 
needed for the minimum of maintenance and reproduction of the husband's labour-power could 
be seen as surplus-value accrueing to the husband in terms of increased leisure, or savings on 
commodity purchase, or to the capitalist in terms of lowering the minimum subsistence level 
and increasing the productivity of the labourer. Moreover, if the woman is in a position to seek 
outside work, if then the wages she earns represent the minimum amount necessary to maintain 
and reproduce her labour-power, then this sum can be subtracted from her husband's wage 
which was formerly calculated to represent the minimum amount necessary to reproduce both 
his and her labour-power. Thus, although the woman still reproduces her husband's labour-
power (now she works twice as hard, a sixteen hour day) his wage can no longer reflect her 
dependency. The result is a general depression of the minimum wage and an increase of surplus-
value. In fact, male hostility to women's entry into the labour-market often derives from a 
recognition of this potential threat, it being known that the low pay of women lowers the pay of 
all workers generally. At the same time it is a standard argument that women should be paid 
less because the ideological norm maintains that women have no one to support apart from 
themselves, while men are regarded as the bread-winners of whole families. But whatever hard-
won value the working-woman's wage adds to the family budget is offset by the additional 
expenditure involved in the necessary consumption of additional commodities. If the woman is 
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out of the house all day, it is inevitable that more pre-packaged, ready-cooked food, more off-
the-hook clothing more disposable items are going to make up for the time and energy consumed 
in work outside that would otherwise have been spent making these items in the traditional way. 
The coincidence of the expansion of take-away food establishments and the augmentation of 
the female work-force has been frequently cited as an illustration of this tendency. 
Having examined the function that the capitalist ideology and mode of production re-
quires of women we are now in a position to see why this ideology persists even though the 
reality is frequently quite different. The ideology of women's reproductive role is evident in 
an abundance of discriminatory practices based upon the assumption that women are depen-
dents and economically non-productive. The most readily observable of these practices are those 
codified in the legal apparatus where laws governing property ownership, taxation, social 
security, financial contracts, etc., make separate provisions for men and women and for married 
and unmarried women. Moreover, the power of the ideology is such that it often contradicts its 
own legal provisions in the attempt to enforce conformity with the sex-role stereotypes. For 
example, if a woman decides to live with a man, even if she does not marry him, she is regarded 
as his dependent and loses her right to claim unemployment benefits, supporting mother's 
allowances and so on. In fact, the position of the state as regards the single adult woman is that 
of a father or husband: it assumes responsibility for the woman only so long as there is no man 
available to do so. Even though in reality a large proportion of married women participate in 
the work-force, the ideology which recognizes only their reproductive role begets all kinds of 
"disincentives" in the form of low wages, poor conditions, dull, repetitive and trivial work, 
discriminatory taxation measures, official reluctance to aid childcare schemes, and the dis-
allowance of childcare costs as a deductible claim from income tax although childcare is nearly 
always a necessary expenditure incurred in the earning of an income. The fact that there is such 
a contradiction between the actual conditions and the official version of reality in itself indicates 
the existence of an ideology operating as we defined it above, as "systematically distorted know-
ledge . . . the distortion being affected (in general) by the structures of interests and values under-
lying the activities of groups producing and consuming knowledge."^ ^ 
Now we must turn to the second aspect of the reproduction of the forces of production 
to which women make an essential contribution. 
The Reproduction of Labour-Power (ii) 
Women are not only required to reproduce the forces of production by servicing labour-
power for the present, but also by reproducing labour-power for the future. This function has 
two aspects: biological reproduction and cognitive, or ideological reproduction. 
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It is in maternity that women achieve their physiological destiny, but asde Beauvoir states, 
it is no longer necessarily an inevitable social destiny. However, bourgeois ideology would like 
to have it that maternity is woman's "natural" vocation. The struggle between the state and the 
women's movement has been most intense around the issue of women to control their own 
fert i l i ty. In France, the movement was first centred around the debate on abortion which cul-
minated with the act to provide legal pregnancy terminations in November 1974. At the present 
moment, in Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain and the U.S.A. to mention only a few coun-
tries, there is increasing pressure from the ruling classes to regain a measure of control over the 
reproductive capacity of women which had been ceded earlier through the liberalization of 
abortion laws. It is significant that these laws coincided with fears about global overpopulation, 
and that now that there is a recurrence of ideas resembling those of the "race-suicide" type, in 
the form of anxiety about the falling birth-rate in Western countries versus the increase in third 
world countries, there are moves to reduce women's control over their fert i l i ty. 
The reproductive capacity of women has always been the fundamental factor governing 
their social and political status ever since the discovery of the idea of paternity. As Eva Figes 
put it: 
Once a man knows that there is a physical link between himself and the child in his woman's 
womb, that, provided no other man has been allowed to impregnate his woman, the child 
wil l definately be his, a continuation of himself, all kinds of things become possible. The 
idea of a personal continuity is born, if man can only control his woman he becomes, in a 
sense, immortal. Power and property can be passed down through his sons and so clutched 
beyond the grave. By playing down the all-important role that woman plays in procreation, 
by regarding her as a mere vessel in which he plants his seed, man discovers and exploits a 
new sense of power, a new domination over his environment.^"^ 
The lack of status, the lack of autonomy and the confinement that women have suffered through 
the centuries and continue to suffer derive directly from the desire of men to control or "colo-
nize" women's wombs: the devices invented to secure this control have been numerous, from 
the mental controls of religious and secular taboos to the modern ideology of the "feminine 
mystique". These mental controls have always been supported by physical controls, f rom the 
practise of infibulation, chastity belts, purdah, ostracization of adulteresses, the victimization 
of bastards to the capital punishment meted out to abortionists. In contemporary bourgeois 
society, the controls exercised by the state apparatuses over women's fert i l i ty are not so crude 
as in earlier and less advanced social formations, but nevertheless still exist. Apart f rom the per-
vasive and persuasive ideological encouragement to become mothers, the low-paid, monotonous 
and future-less jobs that are the lot of the majority of young women workers make marriage and 
maternity seem an attractive escape. Moreover, the economic inducement to maternity within 
marriage as the norm is reinforced by the economic hardship and moral obloquy imposed on 
women who voluntarily or unwillingly give birth out of wedlock. 
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The issue of the control of reproduction has been a centre of contention since the early 
stages of capitalism when Malthus calculated in 1798 that there was a natural and inevitable 
tendency for popDlation to outstrip all possible means of subsistence. Malthus worked out that 
while the amount of cultivatable land in the world increased arithmetically, the population that 
depends upon that land for subsistence, increases geometrically. Malthus's arguments are still 
effective nearly two centuries after he formulated them, as can be seen by the dire predictions 
of the Club Of Rome. His only hope for a solution to the dilemma was that the poor would 
exercise "moral restraint" by marrying late and refraining from procreation. Malthus's ideas 
were taken up by both socialists and capitalists, so that within both factions the issue of birth 
control involved bitter internecine disputes. Capitalist ideologues maintained that on the one 
hand unchecked procreation amongst the working class would create a competition for jobs and 
thus keep the level of wages down and create a climate of disunity among the proletariat which 
would inhibit political action. On the other hand, it was argued that the poverty and misery 
engendered by uncontrolled expansion amongst the lower classes would inevitably politicize 
them and allow them to realize their revolutionary potential. To this argument was added that of 
the eugenicists who became popular towards the end of the nineteenth century in association 
with social Darwinism. They maintained that people of the lower classes and foreigners were 
breeding at a faster rate than their own classes and nationalities and that they would inevitably 
become swamped in a debased and polluted strain of mankind. The socialists were similarly 
split on the issue of birth control. One faction, responding to the "Malthusianism" (used in a 
pejorative sense) of the ruling class regarded birth control as a capitalist means of weakening the 
working class and keeping them under control. The other faction saw the overpopulation 
amongst the poor as the weakening factor, preventing any militancy by keeping the workers 
preoccupied with the day to day struggle for the basic means of subsistence. But the fact re-
mains that it was always those on the side of the proletariat who did anything practical in the 
way of disseminating contraceptive information to working class women. Even so, the argument 
on both sides seldom considered that what was at issue was women's right to choose whether or 
not they wanted to have children and in what manner and with whom. The question was always 
debated with litt le regard for women's individuality or humanity. The impression is rather of 
women being an extension of their wombs rather that their capacity for maternity being an 
attribute of their human-ness. The situation has always been, and remains as Germaine Greer 
expressed it: "between the extremes stands the individual woman, whose womb has become a 
vehicle of government p o l i c y . T h e liberalization of abortion laws and the increased availa-
bi l i ty of contraception in the last few years have masked the control that the ruling class still 
exercises over women's bodies. At the time a stabilization of population growth and an increase 
in sexual "permissiveness" coincided with (or at least, did not contravene) state policies. But the 
maintenance of the control over women's reproductive capacities by the state is evident in its 
reluctance to cede any of the long-term contraceptive measures such as free vasectomies or tubal 
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ligations on demand. 
The childbearing capacity of women is a fact that Marxist-feminists have had di f f icu l ty in 
assimilating into a world-view that seeks to eliminate inequalities between social groups. But 
the fact remains that only women can bear children, only women have that particular reproduc-
tive power and as a consequence there are special needs and issues which have a unique relevance 
to women irrespective of the prevailing social conditions. For instance, the rights of maternity 
leave, maternity sick pay, maternity benefits and health care are rights that women should have 
on the grounds of their unique reproductive power. This does not mean that this unique power 
should be considered as something that should exclude women from all other spheres of social 
existence either as a compensation or a justification, (a trap that the earlier feminist movement 
at the turn of the century fell into), but that because it is a uniquely female power, its control 
should be in women's hands. It is this power that men have attempted to control by the creation 
of all kinds of social restrictions and customs, not only in order to determine wider population 
goals, but also to ensure the transfer of property to legitimate (i.e. the father's) offspring. 
That women's fert i l i ty is controlled by the state is as evident in the restrictions on abortion 
in western countries as it is in the blackmail of underdeveloped countries by the developed states 
to lower their birth rates by any means including compulsory sterilization, or face a curtailment 
of aid. Behind the blandishments and the abstract language of international negotiation is the 
threat that Third World women will only be mothers on pain of starvation. The situation in 
capitalist countries is as Benoite Groult expresses it; quoting a speech by Jean Taittinger during 
the 1973 abortion debate in France: "Tous les jours, depuis des dizaines d'annees, mille femmes 
ont avorte dans I'angoisse et I'illegalite' et tous les jours, une de ces mille femmes en est morte. 
Comme en 1795, il faut etre mere sous peine de mort."^^ Groult also recognizes that the issue 
is not so much the availability of contraception or abortion but the right of women to choose 
whether or not to have children. She finds that the fundamental principle at stake is that men 
fear that they wil l no longer be masters. She quotes a reformist deputy, Jacques Me'decin who 
said: "Je ne peux admettre que I'ide'e que la loi fasse de la mere la seule et unique responsable 
des enfants a naTtre" and then proceeds to castigate this admission with devastating irony: 
Quand on sait de quelle faqon depuis des siecles tant de peres ont fui leurs responsabilites, 
quant on connalt le sort qu'ils ont re'serve a leurs batards dont on aurait pu croire qu'ils 
etaient nes par parthenogenese, quand on apprend que presque un pere divorce' sur deux 
ne verse pas la pension alimentaire de ses enfants, on a envie de rire en e'coutant M. Jacques 
Medecin. Ou de pleurer.^"^ 
In many ways, then, women's capacity for reproduction is the complement of men's labour-
power in that it is a capacity of an individual which becomes the property of others and appears 
as something alien and hostile. Just as men's labour-power is alienated from them when they 
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sell it to capital, so women's reproductive power is alienated from them when the control of it 
is exercised by others, whether it be an individual man or the state. Women are exploited for 
their reproductive power just as men are exploited for their labour-power. This fact is expressed 
most crudely in the official exhortations to women to bear children for the sake of national 
defence, or to administer the colonies as when in 1935 Neville Chamberlain fulminated against 
the day when " the British Empire wil l be crying out for more citizens of the right breed, and 
when we in this country shall not be able to supply the demand,"^® or when in March 1905 
President Theodore Roosevelt condemned the widespread use of birth control by married couples 
saying that it was a sign of moral disease. Like other race suicide alarmists he specifically attacked 
women, branding those who avoided having children "criminal against the race . . . [ they] should 
be the object of contemptuous abhorrence by healthy people."^^ The official promotion of 
maternity in Mussolini's Italy, Hitler's Germany and in the Soviet Union are too well known to 
comment upon. Less crude, although possibly more effective is the persuasion of the socializa-
t ion to which women and men are exposed from childhood that prepares them for the inevitable 
social ful f i lment of parenthood. From their first doll and their early initiation into the drudgery 
of housework to their education which even in the last decade explicitly attempted to prepare 
girls for marriage and motherhood, women are conditioned to believe implicit ly that it is right, 
proper and "natura l " for a woman to find fulf i lment in giving birth to children. The whole 
ideology which derives from the sexual division of labour and which dictates the categories of 
"masculine" and "feminine" reinforces the idea that maternity is the supreme and exclusive 
purpose of a woman's life. It has elevated something that is a specific attribute of women into 
a single, universal and obligatory duty. 
The Reproduction of Labour-Power (iii) 
So far we have examined the role of women in the material reproduction of the forces of 
production, i.e. labour-power, (i) by the servicing of present labour-power, and (ii) by the physi-
cal reproduction of the next generation of workers. Now we must turn to the third aspect of the 
reproduction of the forces of production: the ideological formation of labour-power. 
In his essay, "Ideology and the State", Louis Althusser recognized that in addition to the 
material requisites of labour-power, it must also be reproduced ideologically in order to acquire 
the necessary skills and demeanour to perform the various tasks allotted in the structure of 
productive relations: 
. . . it is not enough to ensure for labour power the material conditions of its reproduction 
if it is to be reproduced as labour-power. I have said that the available labour power must 
be "competent" , i.e. suitable to be set to work in the complex system of the process of pro-
duction. The development of the productive forces and the type of unity historically con-
stitutive of the productive forces at a given moment produce the result that the labour-
power has to be (diversely) skilled and therefore reproduced as such. Diversely: according to 
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the requirements of the socio-technical division of labour, its different "jobs" and 
These skills are increasingly provided for outside the strict confines of production. Where, for-
merly, training was received at the actual work-site, the house for women, the factory floor for 
male apprentices, the office for future administrators, now these functions are increasingly being 
taken over by the education system and other institutions. But more important than the actual 
"know-how" instilled in future workers and administrators by the education system is the 
teaching of correct behaviour and language according to the particular niche in the hierarchy 
that the student is destined to occupy. As Althusser says: 
. . . the reproduction of labour-power requires . . . at the same time, a reproduction of its 
submission to the rules of established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling 
ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling 
ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they too, will 
provide for the domination of the ruling class "in words".^' 
With respect to women, the applications of this view are obvious. The role women are destined 
to play in the structure of the relations of production is that of reproduction, as we have already 
seen, and it is for this role that their educative experience prepares them. This experience begins 
even before the actual entry into formal education. Apart from all the behavioural and tem-
peramental conditioning that determine the individual's adherence to one or other of the sex-
defined categories, little girls are educated from an early age in the skills of reproduction. They 
are given dolls to play with allowing them to practise their future maternal roles; if they have 
younger brothers or sisters they are often asked to assist with the tasks involved in feeding, 
cleaning or minding them. Both her sex and her confinement in the house make it more certain 
that the little girl will be obliged to help with the housework — sweeping, dusting, peeling pota-
toes and so on — that her brother would be excused. 
This pre-school training of girls for their future function in the reproduction of labour-
power continues within the education system, but it takes on a more negative aspect in that 
women are discouraged from learning the skills of production that will be the province of boys. 
The history of women's struggle for equal educational opportunities is in itself instructive: the 
right of women to education was a frequent theme of early feminists of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and has been central to feminist claims as late as the 1930's when we see 
Virginia Woolf demanding the same rights that Mary Wollstonecraft had demanded one and a 
half centuries earlier. It is also significant that the first practical achievements of the women's 
education demands were the industrial training of working class women and the training for 
charity work of middle class women. At the present moment, it appears that superficially, at 
least, women have achieved equality in educational opportunities, but a closer examination 
shows that in fact the overall effect of education is still to provide for a division of labour 
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according to sex. Arguments are still heard in favour of the functional orientation of girls'edu-
cation that would teach them "social graces", housecraft, cooking, needlework and mothercraft, 
and although thes'e arguments are no longer fashionable there is still a prevalent, if unspoken 
assumption among teachers, educational administrators and the general society alike that women 
are destined to become wives and mothers. It is quite common, for example to hear people ad-
vocating the restriction of women's entry into the schools for training exclusive professionals 
like doctors and lawyers on these grounds. This general assumption affects children throughout 
their educative experien^ce and has the result of a marked differentiation of attainment among 
boys and girls. Figures show that despite equal (and often higher) academic achievement of 
women throughout the education system where they compete with men, yet the higher up the 
education " ladder", the fewer the number of women participating. Thus, in Great Britain for 
example, it appears that although the number of boys and girls entering for 'O' Level exams was 
identical, and the performance of girls was slightly better, they were nevertheless less inclined to 
proceed to 'A ' Levels than boys: 
Percentage of all leavers gaining GCE passes 
Boys Girls 
3 or more ' 0 ' Level passes 28 29 
5 or more ' 0 ' Level passes 21 22 
2 or more 'A ' Level passes 13 9 
3 or more 'A ' Level passes 9 6 3 2 
As the table shows, at the higher level of secondary education, there is a clear difference between 
the sexes. It appears that more boys than girls achieve 'A' Level passes. This is not due to a higher 
failure rate among girls, but is rather the result of the tendency of fewer girls to enter fewer 
subjects. Despite their slightly better results, more girls left school before the age of eighteen than 
did boys (14% v. 12%). Moreover, girls tend to attempt fewer subjects because they are advised 
to or because they feel incapable of doing more. 
When it comes to higher education we find that the tendency for women to be sifted out 
of the areas of higher attainment is more pronounced: in 1969-70, 19% of boys compared with 
23% of girls leaving school went on t a full-time further or higher education. However, more 
than half of these girls went into colleges of higher education to take mostly short-term, low-level 
courses such as short-hand and typing, catering and book-keeping. In contrast, only one in six 
boys are to be found in these lower status institutions. Among those doing part-time further 
education we find 38% of boys attending part-time courses as against only 12% of girls. This is 
partly because employers are much more likely to give boys time off work for part-time study 
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than they are girls. It is inevitable that in these circumstances sonnething like 85% of women in 
the work-force have no job skills. Perhaps the most instructive figures are those which show that 
only 5% of girls are apprenticed on leaving school and of these 90% chose hairdressing. Hov^/ever, 
in 1977, the average wage for qualified women hairdressers was £29.80, around two thirds of 
the average female wage.^^ 
The same pattern of under-achievement is repeated at university level: in 1970, 30% of 
undergraduates were women, 16% of postgraduates, 9% of university teachers and 1% of pro-
fessors were women. At no time do women show an inferior standard of academic achievement, 
nor are there any formal impediments to achievement. These British figures are echoed in France 
where the number of boys (including apprentices) between 14 and 18 who are undertaking full-
time education is greater than that of girls of a similar age. In post secondary education it appears 
that girls choose courses of shorter duration (48% of students in 3-year courses and 57% in 2-year * 
courses are girls). 
Al l this is evidence in support of Althusser's thesis that the education fits children for their 
future roles in society by determining the distance that they go in their studies and the quality 
and content of their learning. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the way in which this 
system operates to determine the positions of men and women visa vis the productive apparatus 
is the way in which boys are channelled towards the productive "know-how" of mathematics 
and science, while girls are channelled towards the arts and humanities.* It almost goes without 
saying that mathematics and science are the avenues to power and prosperity in this society 
where most of the top professions require a mathematical background. From an early age girls 
are found to score better in tests of verbal ability while boys are better at numeracy, it seems 
that this is a result of a combination of factors which are environmentally determined and 
ultimately derive f rom the ideological sexua! role models. Peer group pressure and teacher expec-
tations both spring from assumptions about the innate capacities of the female. Mathematical 
ability is generally considered in some way "unfeminine", their competition with men is seen 
paradoxically as hopeless and destructive of their chances of being sexually attractive to their 
male competitors. Women who are slow maths learners are excused on the grounds that they 
don't have a "mathematical mind" instead of being encouraged by remedial tutoring. The result 
of this coordinated discouragement is that many women are unprepared for the mathematical 
calculations involved in the sciences. Figures from Great Britain show that in the mid sixties 
only 25% of girls who passed in two or more 'A ' Levels did so in science subjects alone. 
•See A p p e n d i x , Tables 3, 4 , 5, 6 and 7 
•See A p p e n d i x , Table 7 
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compared with 66% who passed in arts subjects only. On the other hand, 57% of boys passed in 
science subjects compared with 38% who restricted themselves to the arts. In 1970 more than 
four times as many boys as girls took ' 0 ' Levels in Physics and nearly three times as many took 
' 0 ' Level chemis t r y .These figures become significant when one considers the fact that it is 
easier to get university places in pure or applied sciences than in arts or social sciences. In an arti-
cle entitled "Math Anxiety", Sheila Tobias underlines the significance of women's mathematical 
"anxiety" which she claims has a disproportionate effect on "females and racial minorities of 
both sexes". 
Of the entering class at Berkeley in 1973, Sells reported 57 per cent of the males brought 
with them four years of high school math, but only 8 per cent of the entering females had 
the same preparation. Thus, 92% of the women in the first-year class were not even eligible 
to take any calculus or intermediate level statistic course. Moreover, all but five of the 
twenty majors at Berkeley in the early 1970's required either calculus or statistics. Women, 
then, were crowding themselves into the remaining five fields (the humanities, music, 
social work, elementary education, guidance and counselling), not only because of sex-role 
socialisation but because of math avoidance.^ ^ 
The curtailment of educational opportunities for women, the channelling of women away 
from the "know-how" applicable to the productive sphere ensure that women are confined to 
the function of reproduction which is what society requires of them. It also ensures, partly as 
an added inducement to remain in the reproductive sector, that women who enter the workforce 
are confined to low-pay, low-status and low-skilled jobs. In other words, the educational ap-
paratus serves to reproduce those skills in women necessary for their function in the productive 
process. 
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THE REPRODUCTION OF THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION 
(i) Ideology 
So far I have been dealing wi th the reproduction of the forces of production; now we must 
turn to the consideration of the relations of production. We have examined the funct ion of 
women's oppression wi thin the capitalist system of production, where women are typecast into 
reproducers of labour-power outside the immediate domain of production. We have seen how, 
despite the large number of women engaged in paid employment, the dominant social def ini t ion 
of woman is as a wife and mother. This defini t ion and its material practice gives us a scheme 
where, in the continual process of production and reproduction of the forces of production in 
the form of labour-power, we have three different modes of relating to that labour-power: 
(i) the possession of it by the labourer as a commodi ty, (ii) the exploitation of it by anyone wi th 
the capital to purchase i t , and (iii) the reproduction of it for resale. These relationships are the 
relations of production. It is the relations of production that define the funct ion and hence 
status of each group within society. To maintain the existing class structure the existing relations 
of production have to be maintained. To understand this is to understand why the oppression of 
women persists, and to understand both we must turn to an examination of the State, because 
it is the funct ion of the State to maintain the prevailing class structure. 
In the " Ideology and the State" Althusser evokes the Marxist classics of The Communist 
Manifesto and the Eighteenth Brumaire to support the notion that the State is in the last resort 
a "machine of repression" which functions to maintain the domination of the ruling class and 
the subjection of the working class. To Althusser's analysis it is necessary to add that the State 
also serves to maintain the existing social relations between the sexes, which, as we have seen, 
are ult imately based on the economic premises of production and reproduction. The repressive 
State apparatus of the police, the courts, the prisons and so on, backed up in the final instance 
by the mil i tary serves equally well to maintain class relations as it does to maintain the social 
relations between the sexes, as any women who have posed a serious threat to the sexual status 
quo have learned at their cost. As recently as 1943, Mme Giraud, a laundress was guillotined in 
France for performing abortions, while the small number of rape victims who attain a conviction 
against their aggressors testifies to the bias of the judicial apparatus in such cases. Kate Millet 
underlined the repressive nature of the patriarchal state when she remarked that " the mil i tary, 
industry, technology, universities, science, political office, and finance — in short, every avenue 
of power wi th in society, including the coercive force of the police, is entirely wi th in male 
hands."^^ The crucial concept is that of power. Althusser makes the important distinction 
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between the State apparatus and State power: the State apparatus may (and has historically) 
survive the transfer of State power from one class to another. It is the power rather than the 
apparatus of the state which is the object of class struggle. Althusser makes this distinction in 
order to propose an analysis of something that classical Marxism has hitherto neglected to sys-
tematize. Having differentiated between State power and State apparatus, he now sees that 
State apparatus as consisting of two distinguishable but ultimately interdependent aspects: the 
(repressive) State apparatus and the Ideological State apparatuses. The State apparatus is, as we 
have seen, composed of the government, the administration, the army, the police, the courts, the 
prisons, etc. Under the category of the Ideological State apparatuses, Althusser lists a number 
of institutions which he names as: 
the religious ISA (the system of different churches), 
the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private "Schools"), 
the family ISA, 
the legal ISA, 
the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties), 
the trade-union ISA, 
the communications ISA (press, radio, television, etc.), 
the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, etc.).^'^ 
To these Ideological State apparatuses I would add the ISA of psychiatry, which, as radical 
psychiatrists like Thomas Szasz, R.D. Laing and David Cooper have shown, is frequently used 
as potent means of obtaining ideological consensus. Its application to women has been documen-
ted by Phyllis Chesler in her Women and Madness-, where persuasion fails, coercion and restraint 
take over. 
There are a number of factors which distinguish the Ideological State apparatuses (ISA's 
for short) from the (repressive) State apparatus: whereas the latter is unified by a direct relation-
ship to the ruling class, i.e. the class possessing state power, the former are a plurality whose 
unity is not immediately visible. This gives rise to the observation that the ISA's are pre-
dominantly in the private sector while the State apparatus is quite obviously in the public sector. 
That the ISA's nevertheless function as agents of the State is possible because of an identity of 
interest between the two sectors: the ruling ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. The 
third distinction that Althusser makes is this: that the Repressive State apparatus functions 
predominantly by violence, while the Ideological State apparatuses function predominantly 
through ideology. Both, however contain elements of each other in that the repressive State 
apparatus needs to have a functional ideology to maintain cohesion and continuity, while the 
ISA's contain elements of violence evident in punishment, excommunication, censorship, etc. 
It is this mutual participation in each other's "methodology" which provides a pattern of mutual 
support and interaction between the State apparatus and the ISA's. In the light of this inter-
action it becomes clear in what lies the unity behind the diversity of the various ISA's: 
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If the ISA's "function" massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their diver-
sity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by which they function is always in 
fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which 
is the ideology of 'the ruling class'.^ ® 
It is self-evident that there will be an identity of interest between those who control the repres-
sive State apparatus and those who control the ISA's since both apparatuses are the means by 
which the ruling class holds the power of the State. Control of both kinds of apparatus is a 
necessary condition for retaining control over the society as a whole. Althusser states with em-
phasis that, to his knowledge "no class can hold State power over a long period without at the 
same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses."^^ The truth 
of this is born out by the banal but nevertheless apposite observation that in cases of military 
coups, where the rebels control the ultimate guarantee of the repressive State apparatus, namely 
the military, the primary object of contention is invariably the means of communication, radio, 
television, telecommunications networks, etc. It is only a small step from here to the conclusion 
that Althusser makes to the effect that "the Ideological State Apparatuses may not only be the 
stake, but also the site of the class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle.""* ° To 
support this important contention, he quotes Marx's statement from the preface to A Contribu-
tion to the Critique of Political Economy, to the effect that it is necessary to distinguish between 
the material transformation of the economic conditions of production and "the ideological 
forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.'"*' This is a significant 
statement not only because it establishes a common ground between Althusser and the Marxist 
humanists he so forcefully decries, but because it makes explicit Marx's imprimatur to the 
so-called superstructural issues that vulgar Marxists condemn. It makes intelligible the importance 
placed by all oppressed groups on the influence of education, religion, literature, cinema, the 
media, etc., on the success or failure of their struggle for liberation. !n terms of the feminist 
offensive, this idea renders coherent all the isolated challenges to the male hegemony in educa-
tion, the law, the media, the trade-unions and the literary world of publishing and criticism, 
whilst at the same time maintaining a perspective on the economic origins of the whole issue. 
Having posited the existence of these Ideological State apparatuses as agents of the class 
that controls the State power, related to, though differentiated from the Repressive State appara-
tus, Althusser then goes on to ask what their function is and what makes them so important. 
The answer is, of course, that their function is to reproduce the relations of production. The 
reproduction of the relations of production is, according to Althusser, secured by the lego-
political and ideological superstructure: "for the most part, it is secured by the exercise of State 
Power in the State Apparatuses, on the one hand the (Repressive) State Apparatus, on the other 
the Ideological State Apparatuses.""^ The repressive State apparatus has the task of securing 
the conditions necessary for the operation of the ISA's, so that the latter can act behind the 
26 
shield of the former, rather as the forces whose task is to secure "the hearts and minds", to use 
the jargon of Viet Nam, follow in the wake of the forces of "pacification". The repressive State 
apparatus establishes and maintains the relations of production by force, while the ideological 
state apparatuses follow, justifying that situation and making it seem not only right, but also 
"natural". 
The most important of the ISA's in Althusser's opinion is the education system, because, 
under capitalism education is universal and compulsory. It teaches values of submission to 
authority, civic responsibility, nationalism, etc., (besides the appropriate skills of each sector of 
the division of labour) that contribute to the continued rule of society by a powerful minority. 
It takes children of every class from an early age and teaches them the "know-how" required 
by an increasingly technical mode of production combined with the ruling-class ideology. At 
periodic intervals, groups are ejected from the education system with the appropriate "know-
how" and ideology to suit the position they are to occupy in the exploitative hierarchy. 
Althusser believes that school has replaced the Church as the chief ideological State apparatus. 
In economic social formations preceding capitalism, the Church incorporated the educational 
and cultural ideological functions now appropriated by the school. But both the Church in pre-
capitalist formations and the school in our epoch are linked to the family, because it is the 
family that has always had the role of primary socialization. But before we proceed to examine 
the function of the family as an ideological State apparatus, the importance of which Althusser 
underestimates, we must briefly examine the particular way in which he conceives the idea of 
ideology. 
For Althusser, ideology is almost coextensive in meaning with "reality". Ideology corres-
ponds to the way we experience the world and interpret it. In his essay "Marxism and Human-
ism", he defines ideology as "a system (with its own logic and rigour) of representations (images, 
myths, ideas or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a historical existence and role 
within a given society.""*^ Ideologies have the function of integrating and unifying the disparate 
elements of society, giving the members the idea of the totality of their social formation in 
history. 
So ideology is as such an organic part of every social totality. It is as if human societies 
could not survive without these specific formations, these systems of representations (at 
various levels), their ideologies. Human societies secrete ideology as the very element and 
atmosphere indispensable to their historical respiration and life.'*'* 
Ideology is the way in which people "live" their world; it informs their perception of the world 
in all its facets. It is a kind of unconscious structuring of consciousness. In fact Althusser uses 
Freud's theory of the unconscious as an analogy for his idea of ideology, in that both are eternal 
in the sense that they are trans-historical. It is this that leads him to distinguish between 
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ideolog/es and ideology (the theory) in general. Ideolog/es have a history because they are pro-
ducts of historical circumstance, for example, the German ideology criticized by Marx and 
Engels. 
Ideology in general is a "representation" of the imaginary relationship of individuals to 
their real conditions of existence. In the formulation of this thesis Althusser sharply differen-
tiates his position f rom that of Feuerbach and the early Marx of The 1844 /W s^ and The Jewish 
Question. Feuerbach and the young Marx held that ideology was the representation of the real 
conditions of existence in imaginary form made necessary by the material alienation which 
prevailed in society. Contrary to this view, Althusser claims that " i t is not their real conditions 
of existence, their real world, that 'men' 'represent to themselves' in ideology, but above all it 
is their relations to these conditions of existence which is represented to them t h e r e . T h i s 
is also the basis for his radical differentiation of science from ideology, science being that aspect 
of knowledge which deals with the real conditions of existence. Thus his scorn for the 
"humanists" who fol low the young Marx, whose theories are necessarily ideological rather 
than scientific (like his own) because they deal with the imaginary conditions of existence. 
Althusser also believes that ideology has a material existence because it is only expressed 
in material actions and institutions: the Ideological State Apparatuses. Ideologies have force only 
so long as they are represented in ideological apparatuses which act and induce action in their 
subjects. Their imaginary relation to the real relations of their existence takes on a material 
form in specific actions, prescribed by and performed in ideological apparatuses: 
The individual in question behaves in such and such a way, adopts such and such a practical 
attitude, and, what is more, participates in certain regular practices which are those of the 
ideological apparatus on which 'depend' the ideas which he has in all consciousness freely 
chosen as a subject. If he believes in God, he goes to Church to attend Mass, kneels, prays, 
confesses, does penance (once it was material in the ordinary sense of the term) and 
naturally repents and so on. If he believes in Duty, he will have the corresponding attitudes, 
inscribed in ritual practices 'according to correct principles'. If he believes in Justice, he wil l 
submit unconditionally to the rules of the Law, and may even protest when they are viola-
ted, sign petitions, take part in a demonstration, etc.''^ 
Thus we have the apparently paradoxical situation where individuals act the ideology and are in 
Althusser's words, simultaneously acted by it. This is because ideologies only exist in so far as 
they are given material existence in actions. The relationship between an ideology and its subject 
is a reflective one, or as Althusser puts it, "speculary". This is because, according to his central 
thesis, "ideology interpellates individuals as subjects."'*'^ Because ideology is trans-historical -
as omni-present as the unconscious, we are always acting within ideology, we are always subjects, 
or, as Althusser expresses it, "you and I are always already subjects." This seems obvious, he says, 
but this in itself is an ideological effect: 
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It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without appearing to do so, since 
these are 'obviousnesses') obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to recognise 
and before which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out (aloud or in the 
'still, small voice of conscience'): 'That's obvious! That's right! That's true!"^® 
This reaction is a sign of the ideological-recognition function of ideology. Its counterpart is 
misrecognition. Our identities "recognized" by others and by ourselves are collages of such 
recognitions. Our identity as "man" or "woman", "worker", etc. are forms of ideological recog-
nitions. Ideology "calls" subjects and the subjects "recognize" the call as being directed at them: 
. . . ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among individuals 
(it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) 
by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing . . 
But this interpellation presupposes the existence of a kind of platonic ideal of the ideology or 
Subject by which the individual subject is interpellated. Thus the Subject's interlocutors, or inter-
pellates are the mirrors and reflections of the ideal Subject. This mutual recognition of Subject 
and subject creates a kind of perpetuum mobile which involves a paradox of freedom and deter-
minism expressed in the ambiguity of the word "subject", meaning both "a free subjectivity, a 
centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions" and "a subjected being, who sub-
mits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting 
his submission."^ ° 
This "doubly speculary" nature of the relationship between ideology and individuals or 
subject and Subject has a number of results which Althusser summarizes as follows: 
1. the interpellation of 'individuals' as subjects; 
2. their subjection to the Subject; 
3. the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects' recognition of each other, 
and finally the subject's recognition of himself; 
4. the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that Ihe sub-
jects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right: Amen, 
[ainsi soTt-il] ^ 
This inbuilt structure of mutual recognition ensures that having been taught the ideology by the 
education system, the family, or other ideological apparatuses, the subjects will "work them-
selves", without any interference and apparently according to their own volition. Only "bad 
subjects" who question the existing order, flout the prevailing ideology or refuse to answer the 
interpellation of the Subject, have to be dealt with by the repressive State apparatus. 
The relevance to women, of Althusser's theory of ideology and the State is clearly apparent. 
As we have seen, women have an important and well-defined role in the social structure of the 
relations of production. This position occupied by women is secured by all the ideological State 
apparatuses mentioned by Althusser, the most important ones being the education system 
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(which I have already dealt with) and the family, which is perhaps the material form par excel-
lence in which the practices and rituals of women's inferiority are inscribed. It is significant that 
women's liberation has confronted each one of the ISA's on a variety of issues. Very briefly, 
by way of illustration rather than exposition, taking Althusser's tentative list of ISA's we can 
see how each contributes to the maintenance of women's position in the productive hierarchy. 
Feminism has attacked the religious ISA for its patriarchal, mysogynist doctrines, its opposition 
to abortion and contraception, its support of traditional family values and its refusal to ordain 
women priests: the legal ISA for discriminatory legislation of all kinds as well as its virtual 
monopoly by men; the political ISA for lack of female representation and for discriminatory 
policies; the trade-union ISA for non-recognition of women's work, hostility towards women 
in the labour-force, and lack of enthusiasm for promoting women's issues such as maternity 
leave, child care facilities, etc. the communications ISA for being the most visible mediator of 
sexist values and stereotypes; the cultural ISA for excluding, ignoring or misrepresenting women. 
All these diverse ideological apparatuses are linked together by a single ideology which dictates 
what woman is and what her role and position should be. This ideology interpellates the indivi-
dual woman as subject and she in turn recognizes herself in that ideology. There exists an 
ideologically constructed ideal woman which by its very nature is unattainable, but which all 
"good subjects" are supposed to strive for. This ideal naturally changes in accordance with 
changes in the fundamental structure of the relations of production - for example, from the 
pious, self-abnegating, maternal creature of the Victorian age, to the competent, educated, yet 
essentially "feminine" mother of the 1950's and 60's, to the "liberated" working mother of 
today — but nevertheless it always reflects the relation of women to their function of reproduc-
tion. Perhaps the most visible example of the "existence" of this ideological construct is to be 
found in the literature designed for women, especially weekly magazines. These have an enor-
mous circulation and a correspondingly widespread and effective ideological impact: in England, 
"Woman" has a circulation of two million; the "Australian Woman's Weekly" is the largest-
selling magazine per capita in the world with three million readers in a country of thirteen 
million; in France, publications under the heading "arts menagers, journaux de mode, revues 
fe'minines" outsell any other category except that of "informations generales ou politiques". 
The content of these magazines is almost exclusively geared towards housewives and mothers, 
but are nevertheless read by young and single girls to whom are devoted sections on teenage 
fashion and pop stars, thus preparing them for their future roles. These magazines are positively 
oriented towards the family, enthusiastically suggesting methods for its care and maintenance. 
Their regular features consist of recipes, knitting and crochet patterns, home-crafts, beauty 
advice, child-care and home-care advice, romantic fiction, advice on medical problems and 
personal columns. Seldom, if ever, do these magazines which purport to deal with the interests 
of women feature articles in favour of abortion, equal pay, etc., issues which would seem to be 
of far greater importance to women. In fact, to the eye of anyone who stands outside the focus 
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of this ideology, the overwhelming impression of these magazines is one of s tu l t i f y ing tr iv ia. 
Benolte Groul t points out the ideological func t ion of these magazines when she compares the 
contents of women's magazines w i th those of men. Clearly it would seem absurd to see a man's 
magazine dealing w i th suggestions on how to make brioches, advice on how to remove sauce 
stains or to maintain the crease in one's trousers, or how to play w i th the chi ldren on Sundays, 
she says. The ideological ideal is to be found in the physical image to which every woman is 
invited to aspire, bu t never actually succeeds in attaining. As Groul t says, men know by ex-
perience "qu ' i l s peuvent se permettre d'etre chauves, amputes, bedonnants on vieux, sentir la 
vieil le pipe ou avoir le nez de Cyrano et etre neanmoins aime's par la plus jol ie f i l le du monde."^ ^ 
But women on the other hand are under constant pressure to conform to the ideal of masculine 
desire. As soon as girls become old enough, their magazines carry advertisements that make 
them aware of themselves and their defects. Girls' and young women's magazines are fu l l of 
advertisements for beauty aids claiming to improve on nature. The basic premise of this adver-
t ising is that the person it is aimed at should be made to feel inadequate, unsuccessful, f lawed 
or unattractive w i t hou t the particular product . Groul t encapsulated the situation of women in 
everyday life vis a vis the ideological paradigm in Uer Ainsi soit-elle: 
L 'e'minent Paul Guimard e'crivait en 1971 dans un editorial de L'Express consacre' a " la 
Francjaise des spots" telle que les archives televise'es pourraient la reveler a un sociologue 
de I'an 3000: " V o i c i done les femmes de nos vies en cette deuxieme m o i t i e d u XXes iec le : 
elles sont afflige'es d' innombrables disgraces. Leurs cheveux sont sees, fourchus, cassants, 
fragiles. Leur peau est grasse, e'ruptive, a la merci du soleil comme du f ro id . . . Des rides 
ravinent pre'maturement leurs visages et plissent leurs cous. Les dents des femmes d 'au jourd ' 
hui s'entartrent volontiers, phe'nomene d'autant plus regrettable qu' i l s'accompagne d'une 
propension a la fet id i te de haleine . . . On notera que les pre'occupations de ces malheureuses 
franchissent rarement les frontieres de I'univers des detergents. Hante'es par la blancheur, 
elles se racontent de pathetiques histoires de linge pollue', d'eviers graisseux, de sols taches, 
a [ 'exclusion de t ou t autre sujet de conversation."® ^ 
From earliest ch i ldhood women are conf ronted w i th an abstract model of perfect ion against 
which to measure themselves. A " g o o d " girl should do this, behave thus, appear in such a man-
ner, they are to ld . Later, this k ind of exhor tat ion takes the fo rm of the " t rue w o m a n " , the 
" f e m i n i n e " woman, or the "good w i fe " . These models of perfection are always apotheoses of 
the role required of women in the relations of product ion, that is, subsidiary but support ive to 
men. These models or Subjects penetrate in to every aspect of l ife, and each Ideological apparatus 
has an appropriate ideological ideal, sometimes positive, sometimes negative. For example, the 
religious ISA requires women to be pious, self-effacing, unobtrusively engaged in charitable, 
ministering act iv i ty , whi le the fami ly ISA's model is the devoted wife and mother. Other ISA's 
have negative models which in effect say that " g o o d " , " t r u e " or " rea l " women have no place 
w i th i n the pattern of rituals and practices which pertain to them. Women who do not con fo rm 
to these ideological models, who do not recognize themselves as subjects when interpellated by 
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the Subject, are regarded as either not " t rue" women, (that is somehow genetically mutant, 
sexually inadequate or in some way damaged), or are condemned as "bad" women, whores or 
mistresses or lesbians who are out to corrupt society and merit intervention by the repressive 
State apparatus. 
These ideological models operate in and determine every level of social existence, and it 
is their repetition f rom generation to generation that ensures that the position and function of 
men and women in the relations of production remain the same. But perhaps the most tragic 
or cynical aspect of the ideological reproduction of the relations of production which gives to 
women this undervalued, subordinate role, is the contribution that women themselves make 
towards its survival. In my opinion, Althusser was right in linking the family to the most impor-
tant ideological apparatuses in pre-capitalist social formations, the church and the school. Never-
theless, I believe that he underestimates the importance of the family as a crucial ideological 
apparatus, for it is in the family that the highly significant primary socialization takes place. 
The conclusions of modern psychology have made it almost indisputable that the broad and 
fundamental patterns of personality are established during infancy. By the age of two according 
to some sources, five according to others, the psychological fate of a person has been determined. 
Certainly by the time a child enters primary school, its adaptation to the sex-role stereotypes has 
already been decided. And since infants are almost invariably committed to the care of their 
mothers or women hired to act as nursemaids, we can see the significance of women in the pro-
cess of primary socialization, in the mediation of ideologies to the new members of society. 
Thus, the third function of women in capitalist society, after those of reproduction of the forces 
of production by servicing current labour-power and reproducing future labour-power, is that 
of ideologically reproducing the relations of production based on the sexual division of labour. 
It is in the bringing up of children that, as Juliet Mitchell puts it, "woman achieves her 
main social definition."^'* With the profound changes brought about by the increased know-
ledge and use of contraception in the last two generations, with correspondingly smaller families 
and the intensification of the mother/child relationship, the emphasis has progressively been on 
the quality of upbringing of children rather than on the quantitative production of them. Con-
sequently the impact of the primary socialization process carried out by the mother has corres-
pondingly increased, and the concentration of the ideology of which the mother is the subject 
is all the stronger. For it must not be forgotten that the attitudes and values that the mother 
mediates to her child are the product of primary socialization in her own family and of the secon-
dary socialization in the various other ideological apparatuses to which she has been subject. 
This is evident from almost the moment of birth, if not before, when preferences are expressed 
for a boy or a girl with all the concomitant values and assumptions based on gender. Boys are 
invariably valued higher in patriarchal societies, and are consequently treated wi th more 
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attentiveness and tolerance. Benoite Groult succinctly expresses this almost involuntary depre-
ciation of girls as against boys: 
J'ai moi-meme eu trois filles. Mais quand je le dis, j'ai I'impression idiote d'en avoir fait 
moins que si je pouvais repondre: "J'ai trois garcons." Pour trois garcons, on vous dit Aah, 
d'un air admiratif. Pour trois filles, ou pire pour quatre ou cinq, on vous regarde en hochant 
la tete: "Ah? C'est dommage . . . " Et pourtant, j'ainne les filles. Et pourtant, je suis fe'ministe 
et convaincre de I'egalite' des sexes.^ ^  
The depreciation of girls is evident in a mother's behaviour towards her newly born child. Groult 
writes that in a sample of mothers of children of both sexes, 34% of mothers who gave reasons 
for not breast-feeding their babies were the mothers of girls: 99% of mothers of boys breast-fed 
their infants. The length of this breast feeding was appreciably greater for boys: at two months 
forty-five minutes as against twenty-five for girls. Moreover, girls were generally weaned earlier. 
A study by H.A. Moss showed that at three weeks of age mothers held male infants 27 minutes 
more per eight hours than females: at three months, fourteen minutes longer.^ ^ Mothers tend 
to stimulate and arouse males more, both by tactile and visual stimulation, and it is well known 
that the quality of stimulation is an important influence on personality development. It has been 
shown that mothers manifest a different response to signs of irritation in their babies according 
to whether they are male or female. Intractable irritability is in keeping with the cultural expec-
tations of masculine behaviour, and so mothers tend to pay less attention to male infants who 
express irritation, thus reinforcing and encouraging aggressive, vociferous behaviour. In a study 
of the development of female sex-role identification Ruth Hartley suggests four processes which 
are essential to the transmission of gender roles to very young children: manipulation, verbal 
appellation, canalisation and activity exposure.® 
The first process, manipulation, is similar to that of moulding described by anthropologists 
in other cultures. An example of this process is the way mothers "fuss w i th " a little girl's hair, 
dress her in feminine cloths and tell her that she is a "pretty little girl", which is also an example 
of verbal appellation. The corollary of this verbal appellation is for example, to call a child a 
"naughty little boy" . Both manipulation and verbal appellation have an enduring effect in con-
stituting an individual's self-identity in which the gender differentiation component is inbuilt. 
Canalisation involves directing childrens' attention to specific objects or aspects of objects. 
Sex-differentiated toys are a good example of objects which establish patterns of favourable and 
unfavourable response towards objects and activities of adult life which these represent. Thus if 
children have played with dolls, miniature tea sets and soft toys, then these kind of objects will 
have an emotional appeal in later life. In the same way mothers will tend to choose toys for 
their little girls of the same type that they enjoyed or coveted at the same age. 
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Activi ty exposure is the process of socialization in which children are exposed to the acti-
vities of adults which become example of behaviour to imitate. Thus, in a traditional nuclear 
family the mother wil l be observed doing the indoor domestic chores, while the father is seen to 
go out to work in the "outside" world. Children want to be like their parents and tend to class 
themselves in the same gender group as the parent, so that they try to reproduce the actions, 
attitudes and emotional responses exhibited by real life or symbolic models. Imitation and 
identification with these models are reinforced by rewards and punishments and differentiation 
of activities. For example. Sears, Maccoby and Levin show that even with five-year olds Ameri-
can mothers tend to differentiate between assigned chores. Girls are confined within the home 
making beds, washing dishes and laying the table; boys more often have chores which take 
them outside such as emptying the rubbish, mowing the lawn, etc.^ ^ But often boys are excused 
chores, or are absent from the home and thus unavailable; at the same time, dirtiness and untidi-
ness are more tolerated among boys on the grounds that "boys will be boys." 
From an early age boys are encouraged to seek challenges, to strive to the limits of their 
capabilities. Girls on the other hand are often taught that they are incapable of meeting chal-
lenges and consequently that they should not attempt to overcome difficulties. Thus the 
inferiority and underachievement of girls becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This "Pygmalion" 
effect of the impact of expectations on performance and achievement was dramatically illustra-
ted by an experiment conducted in a Californian school by Jacobsen and Rosenthal where the 
investigators took a group of children at random and told their teachers that these children were 
expected to make "intellectual spurts" in the near future. When these children were subsequently 
tested, it was found that their performance was substantially better than that of the control 
group.® ^ The tendency among girls to underachieve is evident throughout life, although it 
becomes more pronounced between the ages of fourteen and seventeen when there is a shift 
from acting adult sex roles to actually performing them. At this age achievement seems all the 
more in contradiction to the expectations of the future, and with the social model of the present. 
In an investigation into the sex differences in the socialization of adolescents (by Aileen 
Schoeppe) it was found that boys put more emphasis on developing qualities of autonomy and 
self-directiveness, while girls emphasized conformity. Ann Oakley writes that: "One American 
study reported that over half a sample of 163 American college women pretended to be intel-
lectually inferior to their boyfriends, 14% very often and 43% sometimes."^ ° More significant 
is the differentiation between males and females of the relation between IQ measurements and 
achievement. While males who achieved high IQ scores in childhood were found to reach a high 
occupational level, among women there was no correlation between IQ measurement and occupa-
tional achievement. Two thirds of those women with IQ's of 170 or above were housewives or 
office workers. 
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The fundamental patterns of underachievement in later life are laid down during childhood, 
along with all the other aspects of sex-role identification which, as we have seen are an essential 
factor in the operation and maintenance of the relations of production. It is primarily through 
the mother that the ruling ideology reproducing the relations of production is instilled in the 
child. Thus the mother is responsible for the reproduction of the sexually based division in its 
ideological aspect not only for the present but also for the future. 
It is in the process of transmitting ideology from one generation to another that it acquires 
an objective facticity. A child has to accept that what is transmitted to it as reality is the only, 
unalterable, self-evident reality. The very objectivity of this reality reflects back on the mother's 
apprehension of reality in a way which serves to verify the original, "doubly speculary" ideology, 
reinforcing its obviousness. The transmission of ideology from parent to child is in itself a guaran-
tee of its ideological authenticity. 
The structure and function of the bourgeois model family are inevitably inclined towards 
a conservation of the existing order. As an ideological State apparatus it operates in such a way 
as to reproduce the existing relations of production as long as the requirements of production 
are thereby met. The sexual division and exploitation of women's labour will continue so long 
as they are ideologically confined to a subordinate and reproductive role and are charged with 
the primary care and socialization of infants. Berger and Luckmann, in xV\e\r Social Construction 
of Reality sum up the importance of this primary socialization in providing the mental premises 
for life: 
Since the child has no choice in the selection of his significant others, his identification 
with them is quasi-automatic. For the same reason, his internalization of their particular 
reality is quasi-inevitable. The child does not internalize the world of his significant others 
as one of many possible worlds. He internalizes it as the world, the only existent and con-
ceivable world, the world tout court. It is for this reason that the world internalized in 
primary socialization is so much more firmly entrenched in consciousness than worlds 
internalized in secondary socializations. However much the original sense of inevitability 
may be weakened in subsequent disenchantments, the recollection of a never-to-be-repeated 
certainty - the certainty of the first dawn of reality - still adheres to the first world of 
childhood. Primary socialization thus accomplishes what (in hindsight of course) may be 
seen as the most important confidence trick that society plays on the individual - to make 
appear as necessity what is in fact a bundle of contingencies, and thus to make meaningful 
the accident of his birth.^ ' 
This crucial function of mediating ideology to infants at their most impressionable and 
malleable age is one reason why pressures for more socialized childcare has met with so much 
resistance. Of all the obstacles to women's full participation in the work-force, their expected 
role of caring for pre-school children has been the most important. With the development of 
sophisticated technology capitalism increasingly requires quality in its labour-force rather than 
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quantity, and accordingly the importance placed on socialization and education has increased 
proportionately. It is argued against socialized childcare that collective socialization would re-
duce the spirit o f competition, individualism and respect for authority. Moreover, it is claimed 
that adequate primary socialization requires a close and emotional relationship with at least one 
individual — a relationship that only a mother devoted to full-time domestic duties could fulfil. 
However, perhaps the most cogent argument in the capitalist's arsenal against women's liberation 
and socialized childcare is the economic one. It has been estimated that it would require a mini-
mum of one adult to five children to cope adequately with pre-school children, not counting 
administration and subsidiary staff. The average family has a ratio of two and a half children to 
one woman at no additional cost. 
I have tried to indicate the importance of the family as an ideological state apparatus in 
showing how the sexual division of labour and consequently the social relations of production 
founded on that division is reproduced ideologically by the mother's socialization of her children. 
It is a particularly cruel twist which makes women the agents of their daughter's oppression in 
this way. It is a theme that recurs frequently in the writing of women who are attempting to 
break out of their stereotyped sex roles. The bitterest conflict is nearly always between the 
mother and daughter as the daughter rebels against the values inculcated in her from birth by 
her mother, values which are by definition those which give the mother a sense of meaning, 
significance and worth. The examples are numerous: one thinks of the influence of the long-dead 
Mrs Ramsay over her children in Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse; the conflict between Martha 
Quest and her mother in Doris Lessing's Children of Violence series; Simone de Beauvoir's 
ambivalent feelings towards her mother in Memoires d'une jeune fille rangee and Una morte 
tres douce. The feminist poet Robin Morgan restates this theme, but with a new understanding 
that there is more to the conflict than the two immediate personalities: 
Who sent us to that wilderness we both now know, 
although I blamed you for that house of women 
too many years.^ ^ 
The family, then, is the institution within which are laid down many of the fundamental 
categories upon which much of the ideological superstructure is built - the most important 
being sex-roles and the patterns of authority and submission essential to a class society. 
This brings us to the end of the analysis of the position and function of women in capitalist 
social formations. We have seen how the state, using a combination of repressive and ideological 
apparatuses, acts to channel women into a reproductive role: reproduction not only in the most 
usual sense of biological reproduction of the species, but also in the senses of the reproduction 
of labour-power by the servicing of present labour-power and the ideological conditioning of 
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future labour-power. 
Althusser's analysis of ideology is directly relevant to the understanding of literary creation. 
This is because writers, like any other human beings in society "live" an ideology. As we have 
seen, ideology corresponds to the way we see the world and the way we interpret reality: it 
determines all our actions and thoughts. It is the unconscious structuring of unconsciousness. 
It is inevitable then, that ideology should be a major factor in the consideration of any literary 
work: not only the substance of the work - what it says just as much as what it omits to say -
but also the external circumstances that determine its very existence are conditioned by ideology. 
Not least in the consideration of the part played by ideology in the production of literature is 
the fact that not only the authors are affected by the ideology which is "an organic part of 
every social totality" but also every other person in the productive chain from producer to 
consumer. The process of selection which operates on the raw manuscript, on the part of the 
reader, the publisher, the bookseller and eventually the public, is also conditioned to a large 
extent by the prevailing ideology. The consideration of the part played by ideology in the pro-
duction of literature is especially important in the examination of literature written by women. 
When we reflect that the ideology which places women in a subordinate, dependent, reproductive 
position in relation to men is the ideology of those who control the means of production, and 
when we also observe that the means of literary production (i.e. the publishing apparatus) is 
also controlled by the latter, then we must concede that the prevailing ideology must have 
some influence on women's literature. 
Furthermore, when we recall Marx's statement that "the class which has the means of 
material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental pro-
duction, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it",^^ and connect it with Althusser's assertion that cultural produc-
tion, including literature, is an Ideological State apparatus, then we can surmise that there will be 
a conflict between the authentic artistic expression of the ruled class and the interests of the 
ruling class which controls the means of literary production. 
Finally, when we consider that the ideology prescribes for women an economically depen-
dent, reproductive role in society and equipped them emotionally and intellectually in accor-
dance with this prescribed role, we must suppose that professional writing is an activity which 
basically conflicts with the material and ideological dictates of women's lives. For when Marx 
wrote that "the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life", and that "life is not determined by consciousness, but conscious-
ness by life", he was referring to individuals as much as to wider social groups. Women, as we 
have seen produce their material life conditions in a specific way - in the reproduction of labour-
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power. It has been established that in consequence they have a different social, political and 
intellectual life and so it could also be inferred that they have a different consciousness. Evidence 
of this emerges in literature, for example, where the cultural idea of the feminine provides a 
source of conflict in women's literature, and suggests that this idea is an imposed, alien quality 
and not an intrinsic, innate attribute of femaleness. The idea of the feminine is seen by male 
writers as something intrinsic to the condition of being female, whereas among women writers 
it is seen as an attainment to aspire to, a quality to strive for. Like the advertising ideal which 
all women are invited to emulate, and whose pursuit guarantees the enormous circulation of 
women's magazines, the orientation of women writers towards the concept of the feminine in 
literature indicates that there is an ideological factor operating that is in conflict with reality. 
In other words, that there is a conflict evident in women's literature between the authentic ex-
pression of the human consciousness and the ideological dictates of the prevailing conditions of 
production that results in certain distortions, deflections and mutations in the expression of 
authentic experience. It is through the concept of literature as a productive practice that I 
intend to approach the question of these ideological factors which bear upon the creation of 
works of literature, for it is only when seen as a productive activity that all the ideological 
factors, both internal and external, governing literature can be understood. 
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A R T A N D L ITERATURE AS PRODUCTION: M A T E R I A L LABOUR 
A N D ARTISTIC LABOUR 
It is well known that Marx wrote very l i t t le concerning art and literature and certainly 
never wrote any sustained and coherent work on aesthetics. The letter to Lassalle of Apri l 1859 
on Franz von Sickingen and a number of passing references to literature f rom Sophocles to 
Eugene Sue have become the slim basis for a rather top-heavy strain of Marxist literary criticism 
that deals wi th literature f rom the points of view of form, ideology, politics and consciousness 
alone. The centre of preoccupation has been the question of the relationship of literature and 
art to the society in which it appears, that is, to the relations of production and the mode of 
production of that society, and to the class identity of the author and the nature of his political 
commitment. Litt le attention has been paid, however, as Walter Benjamin pointed out, to " the 
function of a work within the literary production relations of its time."®"* Although this idea 
came to be recognized to some extent in fact by Gorki, Lunacharsky and the Commissariat for 
Education in the Soviet Union in September 1918 as well as by Mayakovsky and the other 
Futurists,^ ^ Benjamin's essay "The Author as Producer" appears to be the first theoretical 
account of it. More recently, the work of Pierre Macherey has developed the idea of the author 
as producer rather than creator, while the Mexican aesthetician Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez has 
dealt directly wi th the aesthetic implications of Marx's numerous references (particularly in the 
1844 Manuscripts) to art as a form of labour. 
The close association of art and labour is most evident in Marx's early philosophical writings 
in which he most explicit ly expresses a philosophy of man. This philosophy constitutes the 
ethical impulse of Marx's whole oeuvre and is present, if unstated, in the necessary form of a 
purpose behind all his later "scienti f ic" writings. The concept which connects labour and art is 
that of objectif ication, the process by which man appropriates nature. 
Marx conceived of man as being constituted of two different aspects which, fol lowing 
Feuerbach, he labelled as that of "natural man" and that of "species man". He defined these 
aspects of man in his critique of Hegel's Phenomenology at the end of the 1844 Manuscript. 
Both "natural man" and "species man" are characterized by certain needs and powers appro-
priate to each. Powers are understood as faculties, abilities, functions or capabilities which 
exist at any moment but which also contain wi thin themselves the potential for development 
in determinate directions. Powers achieve their material form in actions upon objects which also 
serve as concrete signs of the stage of progress reached in the development of those powers. 
"Needs" are the desire felt for objects which exist in man and animals as drives or wants. 
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"Needs" and "powers" complement each other in that powers are the means by which needs 
are fulfilled, while the existence of needs calls forth tlie powers to meet them into existence. 
Thus "natural man" and "species man" are known and defined by their respective needs 
and powers. The powers associated with natural man are the basic functions of living which 
man shares with animals - eating, labour, procreating, and I would suppose, sleeping. Needs are 
the physical desires or drives towards the objects and actions which sustain life at its biological 
level. In fact, this attribute of natural man, that his needs direct his powers to external objects 
for their fulfilment, is an essential definition of man as a being: 
To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with natural powers 
means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being and of his vita! expression, 
or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and 
sensuous and to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or to be oneself object, 
nature and sense for a third person is one and the same thing. Hunger is a natural need] it 
therefore requires a nature and an object outside itself in order to satisfy and still itself. 
Hunger is the acknowledged need of my body for an object which exists outside itself and 
which is indispensable to its integration and to the expression of its essential nature.^^ 
Objects are essentially the whole of nature, so that the relationship between man as an objective 
being and nature is one that is essential, internal and reciprocal. Man realizes himself in the ob-
jects of nature, while nature realizes itself in man, so that the exercise of man's powers takes 
place as a transfer and transmutation of elements within an organic whole. Thus we can see the 
basis of Marx's claim that natural science and the science of man are identical, because the his-
tory of man is the history of man's acting on nature, and natural history has the same relation-
ship as its object. The depth of this symbiotic relationship of man with nature is expressed in 
Marx's definitive statement: 
The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that the universality which makes 
the whole of nature his inorganic body (1) as a direct means of life and (2) as the matter, 
the object and tool of his life activity. Nature is man's inorganic body, that is to say nature 
in so far as it is not the human body. Man lives from nature, i.e. nature is hhbody, and he 
must maintain a continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man's physical 
and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself.^ ^ 
Since all men have this relationship with nature it follows that individuals have a reciprocal and 
necessary relationship with their fellow beings of the same order, thus establishing that man is 
essentially social. But this relationship with nature and his fellow men implies that man is also 
limited by nature, so far as the exercise of his powers are determined by the existence of the 
objects of nature, by the quality and quantity, just as his needs can only be fulfilled by those 
objects. In this sense Marx says that man is determined by nature. This also implies that man in 
"sensuous" and "suffering" in that he experiences his relationship with nature through his senses. 
All the qualities that define man so far have been natural qualities, those basic mechanisms 
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of survival and reproduction which Marx also defines as animal and of which he says: "the 
animal is immediately one with its life activity. It is not distinct from that life activity! it is that 
life activity". Species-activity on the other hand is what distinguishes man from the rest of 
nature in that man is the only being whose life activity is "free and conscious act iv i ty": 
Man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious 
life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity 
directly distinguishes man from animal life activity. Only because of that is he a species-
being. Or rather, he is a conscious being, i.e. his own life is an object for him, only because 
he is a species-being. Only because of that is his activity free activity.^® 
Consciousness of one's life-activity means that one is also conscious of others doing the same 
thing and thus implies a mutual recognition which extends to the whole human race. It also 
gives a temporal dimension to man's existence engendering a sense of history and the knowledge 
that there will be a future. Species activity is materialized in "the practical creation of an 
objective world, the fashioning of organic nature.that is, in free and conscious production. 
The kind of production that man engages in is different from that of animals such as beavers, 
bees, ants or (weaver) birds which produce nests instinctively to satisfy compelling physical 
needs, because man "produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only 
in freedom from such need."''® It is this conscious, purposive activity that gives man the unique 
ability to produce " in accordance with the laws of beauty". Production is the realization of 
man's species powers in objects, to which man relates in a dialectically connected series of 
three moments: "perception", the direct contact of man with nature through his senses, 
"orientat ion", the classification, valuation and general understanding of the objects perceived 
and the network of relationships within nature, and "appropriation", the constructive utilization 
of those objects. Each power, corresponding to a sense, has its own unique mode of appropria-
tion. Marx lists these senses, man's "human relations with the wor ld" as "seeing, hearing, 
smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, sensing, wanting, acting, and loving". ' ' ' 
As we have already foreshadowed, objects exist for powers only in the mode in which those 
powers are gratified. As Marx says: 
The manner in which [objects] become [man's] depends on the nature of the object and 
the nature of the essential power that corresponds to if, for it is just the determinateness 
of this relation that constitutes the particular, real mode of affirmation. An object is dif-
ferent for the eye from what it is for the ear, and the eye's object is different from the 
ear's . . . Man is therefore affirmed in the objective world not only in thought but with all 
the senses.''^ 
Through this interaction with nature over the course of history, man's powers, the objects in 
which they are realized and the modes of appropriating those objects develop. This dialectical 
interrelationship ensures that there are no powers for which appropriate objects are non-existent, 
and subjectively, objects are non-existent for men without the powers to appropriate them. 
Marx uses the example of music to illustrate this point, saying that beautiful music does not 
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exist for the unmusical ear. The senses have to be developed to a suitable level in order to appro-
priate the object, and the development of these senses through the humanization of nature is 
identical with the process of history: 
For not only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses 
(will, love, etc.), in a word, the human sense, the humanity of the senses — all these come 
into being only through the existence of their objects, through humanized nature. The 
cultivation of the five senses is the work of all history.'^ ^ 
This development of human powers is naturally dependent on the mode of material production 
of a given society. The path of development of man's powers through history can not only be 
observed in the modes of appropriation of objects but also in the objects themselves: in Bertell 
Oilman's words, "more indicative still of the quality of appropriation of each generation and 
class are the actual results, the changes in form, shape, number, etc., that are achieved. For only 
man, being what he is at this time and place, would have done these things, with these objects, 
in this way."''"' 
Throughout history we can see in the objects of man's production, his tools, his dwellings, 
his art, customs, institutions, etc., signs indicating the state of development of his powers. Given 
the limitations inherent in nature, man can only appropriate that for which he has the corres-
ponding powers. Tfius the objects themselves reveal the quality of these powers, and also the 
way in which these objects are appropriated expresses the state of these powers. For example, 
the statues of Easter Island can tell us a lot about the state of civilization reached by the people 
who produced them without our knowing anything else about them. Anything that man pro-
duces is the objectification of himself, and is therefore the expression of his essence; Marx 
includes intellectual production and behaviour materially inscribed in institutions: "Religion, 
the family, the state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only particular modes of production and 
therefore come under its general law."''^ But the most significant witnesses to the stage of 
development of man's powers are those objects produced as a means of subsistence: "As indivi-
duals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore coincides with their production, 
both with what they produce and with how they produce."^ ^ This is because material produc-
tion is the most necessary and time-consuming of all man's activities; it is for this reason, of 
course, that he worked at such length on his analysis of industrial production before his intended 
work on art and law which he never accomplished. For Marx considered that "the history of 
industry and the objective existence of industry as it has developed is the open book of the 
essential powers of man, man's psychology present in tangible form . . .": 
in everyday, material industry . . . we find ourselves confronted with the objectified powers 
of the human essence, in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of estrange-
ment . . . Industry is the real historical relationship of nature, and hence of natural science, 
to man. If it is then conceived as the exoteric revelation of man's essential powers, the 
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human essence of nature or the natural essence of man can also be understood.'''' 
Man "duplicates" himself in nature by means of his material products, and the way in which he 
does this is through the mediation of activity. The objects of nature can be appropriated without 
activity, as for example when we contemplate a landscape and feel our senses enriched and 
developed by the forms and colours we perceive. But if we were to paint that scene, or write or 
sing about it, this would be a higher degree of appropriation, mediated by activity. Activity is 
thus the movement of man's powers in the world, the process of objectifying himself in nature. 
A more specialized form of activity is that of work which is defined as activity which produces 
use-values. It is here that the connection between artistic and material production becomes 
apparent: both are forms of activity, the objectification of man's human powers in and the 
appropriation of the objects of nature. The difference is that material labour produces use-
values and artistic labour produces aesthetic values. Use-value is essentially the purpose for 
which an object is produced. Not only are material objects such as tools, houses, clothes, etc., 
use-values, but also other products which as we have seen can include "religion, the family, the 
state, law, morality, science, etc.," are use-values. Thus, a religious dogma, connubial loyalty, a 
state constitution or a heroic saga can "be" just as much use-values as a pair of pliers. Productive 
activity exercises and develops man's powers. In producing an object, all man's senses are engaged 
to some extent in the planning, the execution and the concentration required by its production. 
At the same time, man's powers develop in the active exercise of them. As we have seen, "the 
nature of individuals depends on the material conditions determining their product ion.® 
By altering the material conditions, that is nature, by his activity, man alters the conditions of 
his existence. Thus the creation of new objects calls forth new needs and new powers to satisfy 
them. It is only in tropical climates, according to Marx, that nature is "adequate" and needs no 
modification by man to suit his needs, and so demands no development of man's powers. The 
division of labour also contributes to the development of man's powers through activity in that 
it allows a more efficient, hence more profound and accelerated transformation of nature. 
The division of labour is merely the most visible evidence that man's powers can only 
develop in association with others, that is, in a social context. The realization of human powers 
in the objects of nature through the medium of productive activity necessarily requires the co-
operation of others because this activity is only possible with and for others: it may be active 
cooperation in the execution of some work requiring diverse skills, concentration and goals, or 
it may be passive cooperation as in the case of the use of a language to communicate with others. 
The satisfaction of man's needs necessarily creates a reciprocal bond between the individual and 
his fellow human beings. The primary relationship is of course the sexual relationship which 
Marx regards as initially the only social relationship born out of the need of man to daily repro-
duce his life and propogate his kind, but which later, with the increase of population engendering 
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new needs, becomes a subordinate relationship.^ Thus: 
The production of life, both of one's own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now 
appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social 
relationship. By social we understand the cooperation of several individuals no matter 
under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain 
mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-
operation, or social stage, and this mode of cooperation is itself a "productive force."^® 
The cooperative nature of production is underlined by the necessary identity of production 
with the social activities of consumption, distribution and exchange. The division of labour 
intensifies the interdependent relationship of the individuals within a society and multiplies 
the identity of needs among groups of people. These needs coincide with the development of 
the powers of many individuals to the same level. This is obvious when we remember that needs 
and powers are mutually dependent for their existence and that objects (including man-made 
objects) only exist so far as there are powers to appropriate them. An individual must be suf-
ficiently developed for others to be able to adequately objectify their powers in him. The most 
complete mutual appropriation of man and man would seem to be found in a communist society 
where the development of the powers of others are seen to be the premise for the development 
of one's own powers, and hence the interests of others are intimately one's own interests. Some 
of Marx's bitterest words were directed against the capacity of money to intervene and distort 
this relationship between a power and its object whether that object was a human being or any-
thing else. "Money", stated Marx, "is the universal confusion and exchange of all things, an 
inverted world, the confusion and exchange of all natural and human qualities".®' With the 
mediating power of money, individuals are able to appropriate objects for which they have not 
developed the powers: 
. . . I am mindless, but if money is the true mind of all things, how can its owner be mind-
less? What is more, he can buy clever people for himself, and is not he who has power over 
clever people cleverer than them? . . 
The true relationship of a power with its object would be one of a true expression of the indivi-
dual's life corresponding to the object of his will. This is the aim of history where in a communist 
society the relation of man to the world will be a human one and where "love can be exchanged 
only for love, trust for trust and so on. If you wish to enjoy art you must be an artistically 
educated person; if you wish to exercise influence on other men you must be the sort of person 
who has a truly stimulating and encouraging effect on others."® ^ 
The most suggestive measure of man's species powers in their development towards a 
human, that is communist realization, is found in the sexual relationship between men and 
women, because, as we have seen, Marx regarded this as "the immediate, natural and necessary 
relationship of human being to human being". 
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In this natural species-relationship the relation of man to nature is imnnediately his relation 
to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature, his own natural 
condition. Therefore this relationship reveals in a sensuous form, reduced, to an observable 
fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature for man or nature has 
become human essence for mankind. It is possible to judge from this relationship the entire 
level of development of mankind.^ 
In the Manifesto, Marx states that "the bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of produc-
tion" and says that bourgeois marriage is simply private prostitution.^^ The condition of women 
inevitably debases men, since men are unable to objectify their powers in this essential relation-
ship to any degree of human satisfaction. In reducing women to such a low status man impedes 
the progress of humanity towards the goal of history, "the true appropriation of the human 
essence through and for man."^^ Of course, it is the whole edifice of the capitalist relations of 
production which alienates man from his human essence and reduces him to his animal essence 
which is the major stumbling block to this goal, but Marx regarded the degradation of women as 
an important result of the reigning power of private property. 
The close and fundamental connection of an aesthetic theory with Marx's ontological 
conception of man is quite clear in Marx's early work. He frequently uses artistic images and 
metaphors to illustrate his notions of the development and deployment of man's powers in 
nature: the creation of artistic objects is seen as a kind of higher extension of man's human 
powers of appropriation, as a sign, as it were, of his transcendence of his animal state. We often 
see the assertion that art is a form of production, as when in the 1844 Manuscripts we read that 
"religion, the family, the state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only particular modes of 
production . . ." In the German Ideology Marx and Engels speak of "mental production" and 
"mental labour", and in the introduction to the Grundrisse he speaks of the "production of 
art". The connection between art and the activity which produces use-values lies in the fact that 
both consist of the objectification of human powers in nature. That this need to "express his 
life in real, sensuous objects" is an absolute condition of mankind's existence, we have seen 
already. This need of man to realize his powers in the objects of nature is not merely a result of 
his need to survive and propagate his species, to affirm his natural life, but is a requirement of 
his species-life: "the object of labour is therefore the objectification of the species-life of 
man."^'' In fact, it is only when man can produce objects that exceed the demands of his im-
mediate physical needs both in quantity and quality that he is free to contemplate his subjec-
tivity realized in his products. It is this freedom from production for immediate consumption 
that sets man off from animals, because it allows him to be conscious of his product as an object 
of his creation and thus allows him to stand back as it were and see his personal powers realized 
in the material form of the object. This freedom and self-consciousness is the beginning of the 
multiplication of needs, powers and appropriate objects that enrich and expand man's senses and 
his relations with the world. It is for this reason that for Marx man is "self-created" and is "a 
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result of his own labour."®® Man's relationship to his objects is thus a necessary one: he is only 
subject so far as he objectifies himself, and his objects only exist so far as they realize his subjec-
tivity. Neither subject nor object exist by or for thennselves. As we have seen, this human need 
for self-creation is met in the activity which realizes man's powers in nature, namely: labour. 
The products created by labour express man's species-life as nature transformed, i.e. humanized; 
they satisfy man's needs, and in their realization of ideas, will, imagination and skill, they objec-
tify human powers. The products created by artistic labour also satisfy these human needs and 
express human powers to the elevation of man's senses, including his self-perception and the 
enrichment of his relations with the world. Art and labour both spring from the fundamental 
conditions of man's ontology, his condition as an objective being and his unique status as a 
human being. Art and labour are similar in that both are activities which in the transformation 
of the raw materials of nature give expression to human powers and develop human needs. 
Both are in fact modes of appropriating nature and self. Both human labour, as opposed to 
natural labour or alienated labour, and artistic production share the premise that they are free 
and conscious. When man produces merely to satisfy his physical needs and guarantee his sub-
sistence as under the capitalist system of production or in a natural condition, then his labour 
is forced and is therefore no longer an expression of his human powers nor the fulfillment of his 
human needs. In the same way truly artistic production can only exist in a situation in which 
there exists a freedom from a hand-to-mouth preoccupation with the brute necessities of phy-
sical subsistence. However, the production of the means of subsistence, that is, the production 
of material life is necessarily a precondition for artistic or theoretical production because as 
Marx wrote in the German Ideology, "life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a 
habitation, clothing and many other things".®® It is only upon the satisfaction of these first 
needs that the conditions for the establishment of new needs are developed. These first needs 
are realized in the production of "practical-utilarian" objects that are judged and valued for 
their usefullness and ability to satisfy these needs. Clearly the quality of subjectivity realized in 
practical-utilitarian objects is limited by their ability to satisfy these specific determinate material 
needs. However, when a situation exists in which these material needs have been satisfied, the 
scope for the subjective objectification of man's human essence in his products increases. Thus 
art is the creative activity shaped by human goals, as is labour, but which, unlike labour, is not 
limited by the material utilitarian demands of the reproduction of life, in the expression of 
human subjectivity. 
Artistic production appears therefore as an extension or an elevation of man's fundamental 
need to realize himself as a species-being. The very distance of aesthetic objects from the satis-
faction of immediate physical needs is in itself an affirmation of man's species-being according 
to Marx's differentiation of human production from the production of birds, bees and beavers 
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of which, as we recall, he said: "they produce only when immediate physical need compels them 
to do so, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only 
in freedom from such need."^° Aesthetic objects are the ob\ecXs par excellence of man's subjec-
tive duplication of himself in nature and in which he can contemplate his humanity unrestricted 
by practical-utilitarian considerations. 
The production of aesthetic objects thus plays a leading role in the development of man's 
powers of appropriation through the humanization of the human senses. Just as we saw that 
for the practical-utilitarian productive activities there was a chain-reaction causing the develop-
ment of man's powers, of new needs and of the general enrichment of man's relations with the 
world, so with aesthetic production new objects create new needs and are met by new powers 
corresponding to new senses. The objects of artistic production are eloquent witnesses to the 
development of man's senses and aesthetic sensibilities: "as individuals express their life, so they 
are"; this not only applies to material production but also to artistic production. As with all 
objects of man's labour they only exist as long as there exist the powers to appropriate them. 
We remember that Marx illustrated his thesis that objects exist for men as confirmations of 
their essential powers with an example taken from the field of artistic production, namely 
music: "only music can awaken the musical sense in man and the most beautiful music has no 
sense for the unmusical ear." The development of art is therefore, like the development of 
material production, an indication of the level to which man's powers have matured in their 
interaction with nature. A painting by Giotto, for example, expresses quite a different level of 
appropriation and development of man's senses to that expressed in a Raphael two centuries 
later. Each artistic object contributes to the development of man's senses so that his powers of 
appropriation are continually expressed in higher and more human forms of art: "the cultivation 
of the five senses is the work of all previous history." 
In the same way that man's practical-utilitarian powers were a social product, so obviously 
are his aesthetic powers. Artistic production has a social nature precisely because it depends on 
this social "cultivation of the five senses". Artistic production cannot take place in isolation: 
even if the artist produces for his own satisfaction he produces according to aesthetic criteria 
engendered by this historical cultivation of the senses and "in accordance with the laws of 
beauty." In another sense, artistic production, like the labour which expresses man's species-
being, is social: it relies on the social cooperation that frees the artist from the necessity of spend-
ing his life producing for his immediate physical subsistence. This social cooperation may take 
the form of a division of labour or the utilization of accumulated labour (necessarily cooperative) 
in material products. Moreover, artistic production like any other production is only one moment 
of process which also includes exchange and consumption, a process which is preeminently social. 
Marx makes clear this social nature of artistic production using Raphael as an example: 
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Raphael as much as any other artist was determined by the technical advances in art made 
before him, by the organization of society and the division of labour in his locality, and, 
finally, by the division of labour in all the countries with which his locality had intercourse. 
Whether an individual like Raphael succeeds in developing his talent depends wholly on 
demand, which in turn depends on the division of labour and the conditions of human cul-
ture resulting from it.^ ^ 
We can see, therefore, that artistic production is closely related to material production, 
and except for the fact that the aim of the former is the production of primarily aesthetic values 
while that of the latter is essentially the production of practical-utilitarian values, they have 
many attributes in common. In short, to use Marx's words, "art . . . [is] only a particular mode 
of production and therefore comes under its general law." 
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THE IDEOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO WOMEN'S ENTRY INTO THE 
SPHERE OF ARTISTIC PRODUCTION 
So far in this paper, I have tried to establish two major points: firstly that the productive 
relations of society require that wonnen should be kept in a subordinate, economically and 
socially dependent, reproductive position, and that this situation is maintained by a combination 
of ideological and material forces controlled ultimately by the class that wields State power; 
and secondly, that artistic creation is a productive activity closely related to labour which pro-
duces use-values, and which requires a certain freedom and independence from the all-absorbing 
task of reproducing the means for one's material subsistence. Now, putting these two points 
together, it should be apparent that the material and ideological life conditions of women would 
seem to be incompatible with the requirements of artistic production. This is not only because 
their function is basically a reproductive one, entailing a corresponding "social, political and 
intellectual l ife", and that artistic creation is a productive activity requiring a "social, political 
and intellectual" life of an almost diametrically opposed quality, but also because art is an ideo-
logical apparatus and as such is controlled by the ruling class. For women to engage in artistic 
production would mean a break with their socially prescribed reproductive and dependent roles 
and a radical departure from the ideological conventions that maintained the relations of produc-
tion. It would also require a social and economic independence at complete odds with the social 
experience of women. In Virginia Woolf's words, "a woman must have money and a room of 
her own if she is to write fiction."^ ^ 
The fact that significant artistic activity is so often a professional activity makes the pros-
pect of an individual woman negotiating her livelihood unlikely in a society where women them-
selves were the objects of barter. Because women have had neither the status nor the skills, nor 
the freedom necessary for it, artistic production has been defined as a male preserve, and because 
of this it was inferred that women did not have imaginative or creative "brains". In patriarchal 
societies, the only women who have had the "social, political and intellectual l ife" suitable for 
artistic creation have belonged to the social elite. The Elizabethan period produced a number of 
female scholars and poets, such as Jane Weston, Elizabeth Danviers, Elizabeth Melville and Mary 
Sidney, Countess of Pembroke, sister of Sir Philip Sidney. In the seventeenth century Lady 
Winchilsea and Margaret of Newcastle are perhaps the most important women poets, although 
none of these women are widely known at all. None of them belonged to the middle classes or 
the lower gentry as did Chaucer, Gower and Shakespeare for example. 
So much a part of women's social stereotype did artistic sterility become that any serious 
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interest on the part of a woman in writing or painting or nnusic beyond the requirements of a 
decorative social accomplishment, was vociferously decried by men and women alike. Virginia 
Woolf quoted the-bitter complaint of Lady Winchilsea as evidence of this opposition to any 
attempt by women to write seriously: 
Alas! a woman that attempts the pen. 
Such a presumptuous creature is esteemed. 
The fault can by no virtue be redeemed. 
They tell us we mistake our sex and way; 
Good breeding, fashion, dancing, dressing, play. 
Are the accomplishments we should desire; 
To write, or read, or think or to inquire. 
Would cloud our beauty, and exhaust our time. 
And interrupt the conquests of our prime. 
Whilst the dull manage of a servile house 
Is held by some our utmost art and use.^ ^ 
The opposition existed long before women began to enter the literary market-place in any 
great numbers. Significantly, their entry into this market-place was by way of one of the few 
literary avenues that had been open to women; that of letter-writing. Personal journals and letters 
have traditionally been acceptable means of literary expression for women, presumably because 
these forms of writing were by definition personal and therefore ostensibly designed for private 
rather than public consumption, and consequently were not considered as serious writing. Even 
to-day personal journals and diaries of women are amongst their most successful and popular 
publications; for example, the diaries of Anais Nin outsold any of her novels; similarly Simone de 
Beauvoir's Memoires d'une jeune fi/le rangee was by far her most successful publication; Svetlana 
Allilouyeva's Vingt lettres a un ami made publishing history in France by earning her 15 million 
francs. In England, the publication of Virginia Woolf's diaries and letters has become almost an 
industry on its own. 
The entry of women into the literary market via the epistolary novel did not involve an 
insurmountable break with tradition. Any scruples about the inappropriateness of a woman 
writing for publication could be glossed over by the ostensible moral purpose of these heavily 
didactic works, which only served to establish and reinforce the puritan ethic of the rising bour-
geoisie. Even so, women were reluctant to acknowledge their publications with any pride, and 
many published anonymously. Elaine Showalter records that " In 1791 Elizabeth Inchbald pre-
faced A Simple Story with the lie that she was a poor invalid who had written a novel despite 
'the utmost detestation to the fatigue of invent ing' . "^She goes on to quote a letter by Mary 
Brunton written in 1810 to explain to a friend why she preferred to publish anonymously: 
I would rather, as you well know, glide through the world unknown, than have (I will not 
call it enjoy) fame, however brilliant, to be pointed at, - to be noticed and commented 
upon — to be shunned, as literary women are, by the more unpretending of my own sex; 
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and abhorred as literary women are, by the pretending of the other! - my dear, I would 
sooner exhibit as a rope dancer.^ ^ 
However, it is when writing is recognized as a profession for women that we can see the 
origins of all the impediments to women's engaging in serious writing. As we have observed, the 
whole purpose and result of the sexual division of labour under the capitalist system of produc-
tion is to ensure that women are confined to a reproductive role, as opposed to men whose 
formative social experience destines them for a productive role. This differentiation of roles is 
essential to the maintenance of the relations of production. Every factor that determines our 
social existence is founded upon this sexual differentiation of roles. We have seen how these 
roles are maintained and enforced by the various ideological and repressive state apparatuses. 
We have also seen how the attempts of women to enter the paid labour-force are impeded and 
discouraged by all kinds of means, such as inferior or inadequate education, poor rewards for 
unrewarding work, the burden of additional domestic labour, as well as the prejudice that it is 
not quite "proper" for married women to work (this latter applies more to middle class women, 
but also affects working class women who are encouraged to aspire to middle class standards). 
This division of society into producers and reproducers is inscribed in ideology, which means 
that it is all-pervading and coercive, ideology being taken in Althusser's definition: ". . . men 
live their actions, usually referred to freedom and 'consciousness' by the classical tradition, in 
ideology, by and through ideology, in short . . . the 'lived' relation between men and the world, 
including History (in political action or inaction), passes through ideology, or better, is ideology 
itself."^^ It is this same ideology that governs women's entry into the literary profession. In the 
same way that this ideology which prescribes for women a reproductive role says that women 
should not engage in paid labour (even it turns a blind eye to the exploitation of working class 
women), it also says that women should not engage in the profession of writing. And when 
women defy the prescription of ideology and go out to work or become professional writers 
there are all kinds of obstacles and impediments that govern the conditions of that work or that 
writing. As we have seen, the creation of artistic objects is a productive activity and is thus in 
itself outside the confines of women's allotted role. Hence we find all the ideological objections 
to women's writing in the nineteenth century and the persistent ideological assumption (present 
to this day) that women lack the requisite faculties for great writing, just as they are said to lack 
the necessary (innate) skills or faculties for becoming company directors, astronauts or admirals 
of the fleet. It is commonplace, for example, for male critics to express surprise thaa a book 
written by a woman could be good, let alone as good as ones written by men. Mary Ellman's 
Thinking about Women (1968) is an incisive analysis of the sexist assumptions explicitly or 
implicitly contained in much current literary criticism. In her words, "with a kind of inverted 
fidelity, the discussion of women's books by men will arrive punctually at the point of preoccu-
pation, which is the fact of femininity. Books by women are treated as though they themselves 
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were women, and criticism embarks, at its happiest, upon an intellectual measuring of busts and 
hips".^'' 
These assumptions and the kind of disparaging criticism which is founded upon them were 
absolutely de rigueur in the nineteenth century and unquestionably resulted in a devaluation of 
women's writing both by the writers themselves and by the general public. Just as we saw the 
results of ideological role assumptions on the achievement of women in education, the assump-
tion that women write inferior, or at any rate, "feminine" books, would have undoubtedly con-
tributed to women's underachievement in literature. These assumptions have also lead to the 
neglect or the casting into oblivion of so many good novels written by women; those of Jean 
Rhys, Dorothy Richardson and Kate Chopin, to mention only three authors. 
Victorian male critics often took recourse to arcane pseudo-scientific theories to justify 
their prejudice that women wrote inferior books. It was said, for example, that women's pro-
creative functions sapped their energy and intellectual sensitivity to the extent that their capacity 
for intellectual creation was irreparably impaired. Women themselves internalized many of these 
assumptions and wrote always with the negative and depressing knowledge that their best efforts 
would always be inferior to anything written by men. The force of these arguments was so strong 
and persistent that even in 1928, Virginia Woolf was able to suggest that women's physical weak-
ness meant that they were less capable of writing long books than men, despite the fact that 
women's contribution to the Victorian three-volume novel was notorious to the point of satire. 
Literature reviewers of this period writing in the contemporary journals and magazines 
invariably proceeded according to the stereotyped judgements of the innate qualities of women's 
writing: 
. . . women writers were acknowledged to possess sentiment, refinement, tact, observation, 
domestic expertise, high moral tone, and knowledge of female character; and thought to 
lack originality, intellectual training, abstract intelligence, humor, self-control, and know-
ledge of male character. Male writers had most of the desirable qualities: power, breadth, 
distinctness, clarity, learning, abstract intelligence, shrewdness, experience, humor, know-
ledge of everyone's and open-mindedness.® ® 
Some women tried to confront this double critical standard directly, as when Charlotte 
Bronte wrote to the critic of the Economist that: "To you I am neither man nor woman. I 
come before you as an author only. It is the sole standard by which you have a right to judge me 
— the sole ground on which I accept your judgement."^ ^ A more devious way of circumventing 
prejudicial criticism was the adoption of male pseudonyms. The examples of Currer and Acton 
Bell and George Eliot inspired dozens of imitations in the nineteenth century. 
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In addition to the ideological assumption that women were physically and intellectually 
incapable of writing, there were other equally damaging ideological arguments martialled to 
dissuade women from writing. In Edmond Gosse's Father and Son it is recorded that Mrs Gosse 
used to invent stories to amuse herself and her brothers: 
Having, I suppose, naturally a restless mind and busy imagination, this soon became the 
chief pleasure of my life . . . I had not known there was harm in it until Miss Shore, a 
Calvinist governess, finding it out, lectured me severely and told me it was wicked. From 
that time for th I considered that to invent a story of any kind was a sin.' ° ° 
It was further held that women authors were selfish to write for personal gain or glory when their 
time and energy would be better spent caring for their families or doing charitable, self-effacing 
deeds. Women writers, especially before 1850 were popularly regarded as ink-stained viragos 
whose "natural" maternal instincts had been abandoned. Dickens's biting caricature of Mrs 
Jellabee is well known as a representation of career women as negligent untidy mothers, con-
cerned only with "education of the natives of Borrioboola-Gha" and other distant and abstract 
matters, while her proper sphere, the home, is an anarchic mess of children run wild and dinners 
uncooked. Conscious of this image, and conscious that their writing was only of secondary im-
portance to their domestic duties, women writers made fierce efforts to be model housewives, 
and if they had children, mothers. Thus, like most women who engage in any paid labour, women 
who wanted to make a career out of writing were obliged to shoulder the burden of two full 
time jobs. Perhaps the most telling example of the kind of encouragement a woman could expect 
to receive in the pursuit of a literary career was that given to Charlotte Bronte by the then Poet 
Laureate Robert Southey when she wrote to him in 1837 asking for advice: "Literature cannot 
be the business of a woman's life and it ought not to b e . " ' ° ' The effect of this advice was, as 
could be expected, to discourage any literary activity and to create in her a sense of shame, guilt 
and failure for feeling the temptation to read or write: 
I carefully avoid any appearance of pre occupation and eccentricity which might lead those 
I live amongst to suspect the nature of my pursuits. Following my father's advice — who 
from my childhood has counselled me, just in the wise and friendly tone of your letter — 
I have endeavoured not only attentively to observe all the duties a woman ought to ful f i l , 
but to feel deeply interested in them. I don't always succeed, for sometimes when I am 
teaching or sewing I would rather be reading or writing; but I try to deny myself, and my 
father's approbation amply rewards me for the pr ivat ion." '^ 
The specious moral arguments brought forward against the inclination of women to write 
probably had all the more impact for the fact that an extraordinary number of nineteenth cen-
tury women writers were the daughters, sisters or wives of clergymen. 
Another effect of this general ideological discouragement of women with an urge or a 
need to write was that women on average published their first books much later in life than 
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men, although as the example of women authors became more common and more respectable, 
women began to publish at a younger age. Of the earlier generation of women, those born bet-
ween 1800 and 1820, including the Brontes, Mrs Gaskell, Elizabeth Barrett, Harriet Martineau 
and George Eliot, only 55% had published by their thir t ieth birthday, whereas male writers with 
few exceptions throughout the century published in their mid-twenties. By the end of the cen-
tury, among those born between 1880 and 1900, including Virginia Woolf and Ivy Compton-
Burnett, 58% had published by their twenty-f i f th birthday and nearly 75% by their thir t ieth. ' 
In many cases of course, this late starting was a case of publish or perish: with professional 
writing and governessing just about the only possible professions for middle class women, women 
were probably more dogged about refusing to accept defeat after the rejection of a manuscript. 
Men on the other hand, having been educated and trained for alternative professions would have 
been more inclined to abandon their literary ambitions if they had not succeeded in publishing 
by their thirties. But it was probably the differentiation in educational opportunity that proved 
to be the major stumbling block to potential women writers significantly delaying the start of 
their careers. The lack of a suitable education (and in Victorian times this meant a thorough 
knowledge of the classics, Latin and Greek) was an important determinant of women's writing, 
not only of its content, but of its very creation. In the nineteenth century most women writers 
were self-taught. In a study of Victorian writers by Richard Alt ick it was found that " the per-
centage of literary men who had attended a university or other post-secondary school rose 
from 52.5% in 1800-35, to 70.9% in 1870-1900 and to 72.3% by 1900-35. ' "°^ As for women, 
only about 20% had been given some formal schooling, and it was not until the first th i r ty 
years of the present century that university-educated women entered the profession and even 
then they only represented 38% of all women writers. Attainment of a classical education com-
parable to that of their brothers was felt to be an essential prerequisite for any kind of public 
writing by women in the nineteenth century. They made prodigious efforts to gain acceptance 
by male reviewers who made it their practice to make wholesale condemnations of the female 
intellect on the basis of the slightest errors of detail in classical knowledge. Harriet Martineau 
records in her autobiography how it took her thirteen years of studying after leaving school 
(she was one of the fortunate few who received any formal education at all) in order for her to 
feel herself adequately prepared to be a writer. And this was achieved in the face of family dis-
approval and constant interruption, for 
it was not thought proper for young ladies to study very conspicuously; and especially 
wi th pen in hand. Young ladies (at least in provincial towns) were expected to sit down 
In the parlour to sew, — during which reading aloud was permitted, — or to practise their 
music; but so as to be f i t to receive callers, wi thout any signs of blue-stockingism which 
could be reported abroad.' 
Intellectual accomplishment was felt to be unbecoming in a woman and so there was often 
a sense of shame and freakishness associated with those who achieved intellectual distinction. 
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There was always the sense that any display of learning or intelligence would invite the dis-
paraging epithet of "blue-stocking" or the accusation of being "unwonnanly", and in an era 
when her "wonnanliness" was about the only social value a woman possessed, these epithets had 
a great deal of force. In 1928, the differentiation of educational opportunity was still regarded 
by Virginia Woolf as one of the primary reasons for women's inferiority in the arts. In Simone 
de Beauvoir's autobiography, for example, she records how her studying used to upset her father 
because it meant that she was destined to earn her own living and pointed to his failure to pro-
vide her with a dowry. Despite coming second only to Sartre in her final examinations at the 
Sorbonne, in a class which included such intellectual heavyweights as Aron, .Levi-Strauss and 
Simone Weil, and despite the extensive breadth of knowledge displayed in her works, there is 
always a sense of discomfort about her intellectual achievements as she repeatedly minimizes 
them in relation to those of Sartre. 
The fear of displaying their erudition lest they wound the intellectual vanity of males has 
bedevilled women writers since they first took up the pen to earn their living. Self-depreciation 
and flattery of the male ego has been one of the standard tactics used by women in dealing with 
the male — owned and controlled publishing apparatus and the male literary establishment. 
Showalter quotes a letter from Mrs Oliphant, who was a pre-eminently hard-headed, unsentimen-
tal business-woman and a prolific writer, to the publisher John Blackwood, in which she ex-
presses with abject humility the doubt whether " in your most manly and masculine of maga-
zines a womanish story-teller like myself may not become wearisome."^°^ Even George Eliot 
sternly advised erudite women to hide their learning in the presence of men, and when Virginia 
Woolf makes the suggestion that women should learn to be critical and objective about men she 
does so with a self-deprecating t imidity that displays a consciousness of potential male disappro-
bation: 
And then I went on very warily, on the very tips of my toes (so cowardly am I, so afraid 
of the lash that was once almost laid on my own shoulders), to murmur that she should 
also learn to laugh, without bitterness, at the vanities - say rather at the peculiarities, for 
it is a less offensive word - of the other sex.^ 
The prejudice that erudition and scholarship were a masculine preserve survived even at a 
time of intense feminist activity at the turn of the century when in attempting to reject male 
values and traditional female roles feminist writers like Olive Schreiner, Sarah Grand and George 
Egerton attempted to set up a separate sphere of female intellectual activity based on sensi-
t iv i ty, emotion, subjectivity and articulating themes of women's ties with nature, maternity, 
suffering and "inner space", which still left men the sphere of traditional scholarship and literary 
activity. 
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Perhaps all these moral or ideological considerations that acted as impediments to the pro-
duction of literature for publication by women can be attributed to the privatized situation of 
women in capitalist society. As we have seen, it is almost an essential condition for the per-
formance of women's role of the reproduction of the human means and relations of production 
that it be carried out in private, that is, in isolation from both the actual productive process, 
and f rom other women engaged in the reproductive role. It is essential because the privatization 
of domestic labour obscures and mystifies its relation to capitalist production and the creation 
of surplus value. Privatization makes it appear that work done in the home is not real work 
and therefore deserves no reward, a result that goes on in turn to disguise the essential contri-
bution of that work to capitalist production. We have also seen that the subjection of women is 
closely related to the institution of private property. Women have traditionally been regarded 
as private property themselves and also as a conduit for the transfer of private property bet-
ween men and between generations. The gynaeceum, purdah, the chastity belt are only extreme 
material manifestations of the ideology that rules that women should stay out of the public eye, 
not venture out of doors, only to be seen or express themselves in relation to their men, not 
"make an exhibit ion of themselves" or unite in opposition to their overlords. To write for 
publication is a direct infringement of this ideology. The very word "publ ish" from the Latin 
pub/icare and pubUcus means to make public, to place before or offer to the public, often some-
thing which is by nature private, like a wi l l , a libel or marriage bans. Robert Escarpit in his 
Sociology of Literature mentions that the oldest use of the word "publ ier" cited by Littre dates 
f rom the thirteenth century and means "selling at a public auction", and he goes on to suggest: 
Let us retain this idea of the public auction of a work, this deliberate and almost brutal 
exposure of the secret of creation to the anonymous light of the public square. There is 
implied a kind of wi l l fu l violence, an accepted profanation, all the more shocking in that 
i t brings financial considerations into play. To publish a work drawn from oneself for 
commercial reasons is a bit like prostituting oneself. Publicare corpus, says Plato.' 
The repugnance felt for the public exposure of one's private thoughts and feelings must 
have exercised a considerable force of self-censorship on women's writing, especially among 
women of that class which provided an overwhelming proportion of women writers - the pious 
bourgeoisie. It has been noted that those women who wrote most intimately of the female 
experience in British literature, Olive Schreiner, Jean Rhys and Doris Lessing, were all immigrants 
who escaped the standard upbringing of middle-class girlhood. Even so, Olive Schreiner's letters 
still show a pronounced dislike of self-exposure: "The best stories and dreams I have had nothing 
would induce me to write at all because I couldn't bear any person to read them." ' ° ^  
So far we have dealt wi th some of the pressures that strongly militated against any attempt 
by women to become professional writers. The source of our knowledge of these pressures is 
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to be found principally in the letters, diaries and memoirs of those women who succeeded in 
overcoming them to launch a literary career. One wonders how many potential Brontes or 
Austens never had the courage or the opportunity to circumvent the force of those ideological 
pressures. As Showalter says: 
Many women who exhibited precocious talents for literature never wrote books. The leap 
from diaries and letters to three-decker novels was a leap of consciousness that many women 
never felt strong or independent enough to attempt.' ' ° 
What were the conditions then, in which women were able to escape or overcome the 
force of the ideology that ruled that literature was a masculine activity, a public activity that 
true, "womanly" women should shun? 
The answer is quite clearly that the conditions under which women were able to begin a 
career of writing obtained only when the effectiveness of the ideology was for some reason 
diminished. As we have seen, ideology finds its material existence in the actions and practices of 
an ideological subject governed by rituals that are in turn determined by the institutions of an 
ideological apparatus. Ideology is embodied, if you like, in human subjects, or, as Althusser puts 
it: 
there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subject. Meaning, there is no ideology 
except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the 
subject: meaning, by the category of the subject and its functioning.' ' ' 
Now, the principal ideological apparatus in which are inscribed the actions, practices and rituals 
of the subjugation of women is the family. The individuals who constitute the particular family 
group are hailed or interpellated by that ideology according to the Althusserian dictum: "all 
ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of 
the category of that subject."''^ Thus, the ideology of the family hails individuals as wife/ 
mother, husband/father, son/brother, daughter/sister, and so on. Ideology interpellates these 
individuals because they function in a particular way, and they function in this way because 
they are interpellated by the ideology: "The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpella-
tion of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing."' ' ^ 
Within the family, individuals relate to one another according to their functions, inter-
subjectively interpellating each other at the same time as they are interpellated by the general 
ideology of the family. Thus a husband will function as a husband so far as he has a wife and vice 
versa. One cannot by definition exist without the other. At the same time, they will function as 
husband and wife in the way determined by the overall ideology of sexual relations. 
The outstanding fact about women writers is that a large proportion of them began their 
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careers in anomalous family circumstances. Showalter finds that of the women writers born 
between 1800 and 1900, only about half of them married, and of these, many, like Elizabeth 
Barrett and Georg'e Eliot only did so after they had begun their careers and established a profes-
sional reputation. A number of these married women writers were, like Mrs Oliphant, widows. 
In the general population, 85% of women married. She finds, moreover, that of these married 
women writers only about 65% of them had children, and those who did have children had far 
fewer than the Victorian norm of six children per family. 
This fact would seem to suggest that women were able to become professional writers only 
to the degree to which they were able to escape from the family and the stereotyped ideologi-
cally determined role that their status of womanhood would have obliged them to perform. 
They were to some extent immune to the effects of the ideology because, lacking husbands (or 
having husbands tolerant of their profession if they married after the start of their career) the 
intersubjective interpellation of the ideology lacked any force. Since ideology is transmitted 
through individuals in the form of concepts conveyed or actions or relationships, and the more 
immediate the relationship the more effective the ideology, then obviously for women outside 
the structure of the normal family that ideology would have a diminished impact. For, as Al-
thusser stated, ideology only exists in concrete subjects and "by the functioning of the category 
of that subject", and because a large proportion of women writers are not in a position to func-
tion within the categories interpellated by the ideology of the family, they were able to escape 
the full effects of that ideology on the pursuit of their literary careers. The ideology of the family 
that casts women in a reproductive role and classifies that role as a subordinate, privatized and 
financially unrewarded one, operates to maintain the relations of production essential to the 
reproduction of the capitalist system, and is therefore concentrated on those categories of 
function integral to this structure of productive (and exploitative) relations. Those who are 
marginal, who are not integrated into the structure of the productive and reproductive relations 
to some extent escape the most intense and effective zone of operation of the ideology. In the 
same way, since only a small proportion of women writers had children, most of them were 
spared the task of mediating sex-role stereotypes to offspring, a process which, as 1 described 
above, serves to reinforce the objective facticity of the ideology in the mother. Of course, it 
must not be forgotten that the sheer time and effort involved in motherhood would have consi-
derably reduced a woman's capacity to pursue a literary career. However, the burdens of mother-
hood must not be exaggerated for a time when writing earned comparatively high financial 
rewards and paid domestic labour was extremely cheap. For example, Charlotte Bronte was 
paid £20 a year in 1841 as a governess (with £4 deducted for laundering her no doubt insignifi-
cant governess's wardrobe), whereas she received £100 as the first payment for Jane Eyre 
followed by five similar payments. A governess's annual wage, according to Ellen Moers was only 
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eleven times as much as the retail price of a copy of Jane Eyre.^ It was the force of the 
ideology which insisted that the literary life was of secondary and minor importance compared 
with the woman's" reproductive role as wife, mother or daughter that was just as significant an 
obstacle to the professional writing careers of women as the actual burdens of domestic labour. 
This labour was even exaggerated by the ideology which asserted that a woman who was not 
totally dedicated to her maternal or wifely duties was a poor example of womanhood. According 
to Mrs Gaskell: 
no other can take up the quiet regular duties of the daughter, the wife, or the mother, as 
well as she whom God has appointed to fill that particular place: a woman's principal work 
in life is hardly left to her own choice; nor can she drop the domestic charges devolving on 
her as an individual, for the exercise of the most splendid talents that were ever bes-
towed.' 
It is a measure and an indication of the economic roots of the ideology which establishes 
the sexual division of labour that its force and effectiveness is augmented or decreased in propor-
tion to the relative economic power of the ideological subjects. The effective power of the 
producer over the reproducer is determined by the degree of absoluteness of the division of 
labour. As I have pointed out, one of the essential features of this division of labour is that 
ideally women should be dependent on the wage earned by their husbands. The means of her 
subsistence is computed along with his as the basis of the minimum wage upon which is calcu-
lated the profit derived from the production of surplus-value. The hostility evinced by bour-
geois society where work, wealth and productivity are accorded positive value, towards females 
who attempt to transgress the confines of their traditional roles, is a result of the decrease in the 
power conferred on them by ideology and guaranteed by an economic monopoly. As we have 
seen, the force of ideologies is determined by the functioning of the categories of concrete 
objects, and where the functioning of these categories is anomalous or non-existent, the inter-
subjective "doubly-speculary" operation of ideology is diminished, ambiguous or non-existent, 
and consequently the force of the ideology is diffused and refracted. This is the case of those 
women writers who were single, had supportive husbands and established careers, or who were 
obliged to support financially husbands or relatives who were incapable of supporting them-
selves. An indication of the way that the force of the ideology of the subjugation of women 
decreases in anomalous or marginal circumstances is to be found encoded in the legal apparatus 
governing Victorian society, where women lost their power to control property or wealth upon 
marriage, whereas single women retained that right. For example, in 1850 Mrs Gaskell received 
the unprecendented sum of £20 for a short story: "I stared", she wrote, "and wondered if i 
was swindling them but I suppose I am not; and Wm has composedly buttoned it up in his 
pocket.'" 
The primacy of the economic foundation of the ideological disincentives to women writers 
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is highlighted by the case of Charlotte Yonge, who when she presented her first novel to her 
wealthy and authoritarian clergyman father, was severely admonished that a lady only pub-
lished for three reasons; love of praise, love of money or the wish to do good. As Showalter puts 
it: 
Mr Yonge was willing to bestow his approbation and withold his anger if Charlotte was 
willing to write didactic f ict ion and to give away the profits. By doing good and taking no 
pay she was safely confined in a female and subordinate role within the family, and re-
mained dependent on her father.^ ' 
It is only when the ideology that prescribes the reproductive role for women is not inter-
subjectively enforced that women were able to attain a position of enough strength to challenge 
it. Financial crises involving loss of earning power of the family's male provider was frequently 
the occasion for the start of many a woman's literary career. The impecuniousness of the Rever-
end Calvin Stowe, the improvidence of Branwell Bronte, the importunateness of Harriet 
Martineau's mother and aunt, the untimely death of Mr Oliphant and the financial ruin of 
Monsieur de Beauvoir are well known as the source of so much female literary production. 
These are all cases where the ideological role models of producer and reproducer based upon the 
sexual division of labour are upset or reversed. 
Writing, teaching and fanciwork were about the only occupations to which genteel middle 
class women deprived of a source of subsistence could turn to without a radical rupture with 
their environment. For these women and those single women who wished or needed to earn an 
independent income, professional writing was by far the most attractive prospect. Governessing, 
as the case of Charlotte Bronte reveals, was very poorly paid and a year spent writing an average 
three volume novel of which the copyright could be sold for £100 earned up to five times as 
much as could be earned in twelve months as a governess. The example of Adeline Sergeant, 
is instructive: she wrote seventy-five novels, none of which did particularly well, but writing at 
the rate of five novels a year and selling the copyrights for £100 a time, she made a comfortable 
living, in her best year, 1902, she made £1,500. Mrs Oliphant, who wrote more than one hundred 
and f i f ty published works after the premature death of her artist husband, managed to send 
her three sons to Eton from the proceeds of her writing. Mrs Gaskell able to buy a house out of 
her earnings at a cost of £3,000 " . . . for Mr Gaskell to retire and for a home for my unmarried 
daughters."^'® 
Thus women were only able to engage in literary production by means of a loophole as it 
were, in the ideology which made it a rule to exclude women from all spheres of production. 
But women were only able to make use of this loophole because of a contradiction of capitalism 
that permitted the contravention of ideological standards for the sake of maximizing profi t . 
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It was a similar contradiction that permitted the inhuman exploitation of working class women 
in factories and mines by a society that ostensibly upheld the sanctity of the family and mother-
hood. Alternatively, it could be argued that this ideology was a ruling class ideology that only 
applied to the women of the ruling class. 
Women were only able to enter the literary profession, hitherto almost exclusively a male 
preserve, because there was a market for literature, especially fiction which could not be wholly 
supplied by male writers. The sharp increase in the number of fiction titles published at the end 
of the eighteenth century was directly due to the success of the circulating libraries, which 
also exercised a considerable influence over literary production for a century and provided a 
major outlet for women's novels. But the really dramatic expansion of literary production 
took place in the th i r ty years between 1820 and the mid-century when, according to Raymond 
Williams, the annual issue of titles rose from 580 to 2,600, a large proportion of which were 
novels. At the same time the introduction of steam-printing to books in the 1830's and 40's 
and the development of cheaper bindings made of cloth and board to replace leather allowed 
the price of new books to be halved, with a proportionate increase in production. A rapid in-
crease in the population from seven million in 1750, eleven million in 1801, nearly twenty-
one million in 1851 to thirty-seven million in 1901 coupled with a gradual but steady increase 
in literacy and the expansion of the middle-class also had an important effect on the production 
of literature. It was precisely at this time, from the 1840's on that women began to enter the 
profession in sufficient numbers to provoke complaints from male writers about the invasion 
of their preserve, although in fact, as Altick's study shows the proportion of women writers 
to men between 1800 and 1935 was about 20%. 
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WOMEN WRITERS AND THE CAPITALIST PRODUCTION 
OF L ITERATURE 
It was the whole ideological, economic and social environment surrounding the entry of 
women into the literary market that played a large part in determining the content, quality and 
form of women's literature. For the period when women began writing in significant numbers 
(from the 1840's) more or less coincided with the development of a means of literary production 
which permitted the capitalist exploitation of the expanding market for reading matter. The 
development of the instruments of production allowed for the first time the truly mass produc-
tion of literature. The appearance of practicable type-setting machines, the stereotyping process, 
the chemical pulp process of paper production which reduced the proportional cost of paper 
in publications from two thirds to under one-tenth, permitted an unprecedented increase in the 
quantity of cheap printed material. A t the same time, in accordance with the Marxist formula, 
there was a corresponding development in the means of distribution and consumption. The 
mass consumption and mass production of literary products was only made possible by the 
development of the means of mass distribution — the railways. E.J. Hobsbawm records that 
" in 1830 there were a few dozen miles of railways in all the world — chiefly consisting of the 
line f rom Liverpool to Manchester. By 1840 there were over 4,500 miles, by 1850 over 
2 3 , 5 0 0 . " ' ' ^ The introduction of railway bookstores by companies like W.H. Smith & Son 
provided outlets for cheap editions such as the Parlour Library and the Railway Library which 
reached a large, new and rapidly growing public. 
However, contrary to the hopes and expectations of certain members of the educated elite, 
the mass production of literature did not lead to the proliferation of the classics, "h ighbrow" 
or " improving" literature for the edification of the uncultured masses, but instead produced a 
boom in sub-literary literature and the development of numerous para-literary genres. This 
situation led Matthew Arnold to complain in 1880 that instead of a widespread availability of 
civilized culture, the market was dominated by 
a cheap literature, hideous and ignoble of aspect, like the tawdry novels which flare in the 
bookshelves of our railway stations, and which seemed designed, as so much else that is 
produced for the use of our middle-class seems designed, for people with a low standard 
of l i fe.' 
The debasement of literature by the exploitation by capitalism of the means of mass pro-
duction and exchange is a question which bears on Marx's thesis in the Theories of Surplus Value 
that capitalism is hostile to art. 
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The hostility of capitalism to art has its origins in the close relation of artistic production 
and the activity of material production. As we have seen, both activities have the same purpose 
and result of objectifying man's species powers in nature. Under the reign of the capitalist system 
of production the object of labour is separated from its producer and becomes the property of 
the capitalist. Thus the labourer is said to be alienated from his product; instead of the object 
of his labour confirming his species being, it now stands opposed to him as an alien object and 
denys it.^ ^ ^ 
Because the objects of his labour become alien to him so too does the whole of nature, 
since nature becomes less and less a means of life for the labourer, both in the sense of the means 
of life of his labour and of his subsistence. His means of subsistence is unrelated to what he 
produces, so that, for instance, it is immaterial to him whether he produces a ball bearing or a 
book since the alienation of his product reduces the interaction between the worker and his 
object into an abstract exchange of labour-time for money. 
The objects of labour are estranged from the worker because his activity is estranged. 
Labour is no longer a means of self-expression and affirmation of the labourer's species-being, 
but is merely a means of subsistence; it has lost its free, conscious and creative character. The 
alienation of labour thus reduces man to his animal existence of merely surviving, reproducing 
himself through the basic natural activities of eating, drinking, sleeping and procreating. Because 
alienated labour does not belong to his essential being, the worker 
does not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, 
does not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his 
mind. Hence the worker feels himself only when he is not working; when he is working, he 
does not feel himself. He is at home when he is not working, and not at home when he is 
working. His labour is therefore not voluntary but forced, it is forced labour.' ^ ^ 
Man is alienated from his fellow human beings because he can no longer relate to them as a 
species-being. Since he no longer possesses the object of his labour in which he has realized his 
subjectivity, he can no longer relate cooperatively and affirmatively by means of social produc-
tion. His product belongs to an alien being, the capitalist, whose interest are opposed to those 
of the worker: 
, through estranged labour man not only produces his relationship to the object and to the 
act of production as to alien and hostile powers; he also produces the relationship in which 
other men stand to his production and to his product, and the relationship in which he 
stands to these other men. Just as he creates his own production as a loss of reality, a 
punishment, and his own product as a loss, a product which does not belong to him, so he 
creates the domination of the non-producer over production and its product.' ^ ^ 
Labour, as we know, is in Marx's opinion the very definition of man a human being, and 
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therefore the alienation of labour means the dehurnanization of man; it means the reduction of 
him to his natural, animal being. Through alienation man loses all contact with his human speci-
ficity and becomes an inhuman object abstractly related through the medium of an objectified 
abstract relationship (money) to other dehumanized objects. 
In the same way that capitalism dehumanizes man's powers of production it also dehuman-
izes his powers of consumption. As we have seen, in order to appropriate an object, one must 
have developed the necessary powers of appropriation to a level suitable to these human powers 
realized in the object. But under capitalism there is only one power necessary for the appropria-
tion of objects: ownership. Money is the means by which the power of ownership is expressed, 
just as money is the means by which the worker realizes his need for subsistence. As Marx said, 
"money is the pimp between need and object, between life and man's means of life."^^'^ Money 
Is the abstraction of all man's needs and powers and thus constitutes the universal value of all 
things. When labour becomes not the realization of human essence in the objects of nature but 
forced activity undertaken for a subsistence wage, then money appears as the alienated essence of 
man's species being. Thus human essence, labour, and the products of labour are all reduced to 
the one abstract entity known as commodity. 
The inimicability of capitalism to artistic production lies in its hostility to that process 
shared by art and labour whereby both activities ideally realize man's species being in nature. 
By making commodities out of the products of man's species activity capitalism destroys the 
creative nature of those activities. Art and labour start out on a common basis as creative activi-
ties that express human essence, but they draw apart and become opposed to each other as the 
labour which creates practical use-values becomes wage-labour and loses its creative nature. 
Thus as long as artistic labour remains free from exploitation for surplus value it appears free, 
conscious, creative and human — all that material labour should be. But capitalist commodity 
production which tends to reduce all products to a standard or exchange value constantly 
threatens artistic products with a similar fate. In Va'zquez's words: "The threat which constantly 
hangs over art in capitalist society is precisely this: that it will be treated in the only way that 
interests a word ruled by the law of surplus production, that is, according to economic criteria, 
as wage labour.'" ^ ^ 
Artistic production increasingly takes the form of wage labour as artistic products are 
released into an anonymous market system of exchange that reduces them to the status of 
commodities. Commodities, by their very nature as abstractions, obliterate the concrete qualities 
that are expressed by their use-values. Instead, the value of a commodity is expressed by its 
exchange value which represents a unit of value common to all other commodities. In the form 
of commodities, the products of labour "have absolutely no connection with their physical 
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properties and with material relations arising therefrom."'^ ^ The commodity is therefore emi-
nently the product of dehumanized, alienated labour since the human subjectivity realized in it 
is eliminated. Instead of a product being the expression of a human power, and the means of 
satisfying a human need, and by so doing establishing a human relationship, as a commodity 
it does none of these. Its producer created the product neither to realize his subjective powers 
nor to meet the needs of any concrete individual but only to gain the basic means of subsistence. 
The owner of the product is only interested in its use-value so far as it affects the commodity's 
exchange value. But as a capitalist, the owner of the product is only interested in the exchange 
value which not only reproduces the variable part of the capital (that is the cost of the reproduc-
tion of labour power) that he has invested in it, but which also creates surplus value in the 
process of circulation. In other words, the capitalist is only interested in artistic products so long 
as the labour-power objectified in them is productive, i.e. surplus value. The only form of pro-
ductive labour, for the capitalist, is wage-labour, the characteristic of which we have briefly 
discussed above. 
Wage-labour, by its very nature is inimical to the nature of art: the quality of art as art is 
directly dependent on the degree to which its production escapes the form of wage labour. 
Wage labour denies the human relationship of a product which it reduces to the status of a 
commodity. A commodity is neither the expression of human powers nor the satisfaction of 
human needs. Yet art has these functions in the purest form. A work of art produced by wage 
labour cannot embody human relations but only relations between things; it would be a con-
tradiction of its own artistic status. An example of this can be found in mass-produced fiction 
where we say that the characters never come "alive", are "wooden", are not "real". 
Wage labour, as we have seen, is coercive, forced labour, undertaken unwillingly only out 
of the need to subsist, in this situation production does not exist for the producer, but rather 
the producer exists for the production. But artistic production, as a pre-eminently human acti-
vity, is in essence free production. When artistic production is undertaken as a means of survival, 
it ceases to be undertaken freely and thus debases its artistic nature. Marx touched on the threat 
to art, to writing in particular in his discussion of the freedom of the press: 
A writer naturally must earn money in order to be able to live and write, but under no 
circumstances must he live and write in order to earn money . . . The writer in no wise 
considers his work as a means. It is an end in itself, so little is it a means for him and for 
others that he sacrifices his existence to its existence, when necessary . . . The writer who 
• degrades [the press] by making it a material means deserves, as punishment for this inner 
slavery, outer slavery — censorship.' ^  
Marx, with his long and trying experience with the publishing apparatus, and his chronic finan-
cial straits, was very much aware of the difficulty of reconciling freedom of expression with the 
need to live.'^® Art is also dehumanized and the artist's freedom curtailed by the imposition 
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of the external necessity of having to produce for an anonymous connmodity market. The 
subject/object relationship is destroyed when the artistic product becomes a commodity. The 
artist no longer affirms his species being in it; he no longer creates for a concrete consumer, but 
for an abstract market; he no longer produces because of an inner need but because of an outer 
necessity. The consumer no longer feels his species being confirmed in the aesthetic product 
because its commodity status denied the expression of the artist's subjectivity; it no longer 
fulfils or develops his human powers of appropriation, since it can be appropriated by that 
very substance that was the artist's reward for his labour: money. Vazquez delineates the con-
sequences of artistic production for the commodity market for the creative freedom of the 
artist: 
When an artist creates because of a need to earn a living, and consequently for the market, 
he creates for another rather than for himself, but this other has an external relationship 
with him, much as the relationship between worker and capitalist. His activity assumes a 
formal, abstract character; the more abstract and formal, the more the artist limits his 
individual creative personality in deference to tastes and ideals which govern the market. 
This limitation of the artist's creative personality implies a limitation of his creative free-
dom, because this freedom can only manifest itself in the realization of this personality and 
not in the leveling along with other personalities which is necessarily imposed to the extent 
that artistic labor becomes formal and abstract in response to the exigencies of the market. 
Creative freedom is a necessary condition for the realization of the artist's personality, 
but is incompatible with an extension of the laws of capitalist material production to the 
sphere of art.^ ^ ^ 
The capitalist criteria of productivity actually favour those artistic products that most 
closely conform to the definition of a commodity. The aesthetic value of the object is a matter 
of more or less indifference to the capitalist whose only interest in it is in its ability to generate 
a profit on his investment. He evaluates the work of art in terms of its exchange value rather 
than its aesthetic use-value or its human significance. The products most conducive to the reali-
zation of surplus value are those returning the highest profit on the original investment. In the 
publishing industry, for example, which involves a risky and delicate judgement balancing the 
estimate of the size of a book's public, the size of the edition, the format, the binding, thickness 
of paper, the illustrations, etc., any factor that reduces the element of risk, chance or guesswork 
is likely to increase the profit margin. One of the most effective ways of doing this is to stan-
dardize the product and thus exercise some control over its consumption. This is particularly 
effective with stereotyped components like detective and espionage fiction, science fiction, 
romance, westerns, war fiction and certain types of children's books. Through the selection 
and promotion of products of proven popularity, the calculations of production and consump-
tion can be made with more accuracy. In this way, tried and tested forms, genres and writers 
are favoured at the expense of new or innovative products. 
The kind of products chosen and promoted by capitalist methods of production tend to 
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run counter to more truly aesthetic products. This tendency is reinforced by the dialectical 
interaction between objects and the powers of those who appropriate them. 
Artistic objects that are created freely, consciously as the full objectification of the artist's 
sensibility can only be perceived and appropriated by someone whose powers and sense are 
developed to a corresponding level. At the same time, the appropriation of that object will both 
develop the consumer's powers to a new level and will also create in him new needs. However, 
an artistic product of which the human content is alienated could not possibly develop the 
consumer's powers and senses, but could only correspond to the powers and sense of a consumer 
who was similarly alienated. Instead of each new object resulting in "a fresh confirmation of 
human powers and a fresh enrichment of human nature", new objects and modes of production 
under capitalism have the effect of reversing this development: 
Each person speculates on creating a new need in the other, with the aim of forcing him to 
make a new sacrifice, placing him in a new dependence and seducing him into a new kind of 
enjoyment and hence into economic ruin.' 
The application of this idea to the domain of literary production is particularly striking when 
we reflect that the ideal product for a capitalist publisher is the book which is consumed quickly 
and discarded and which creates an appetite for more of the same fare. Books that are read 
slowly, read repeatedly and enjoyed in a novel way at every rereading are less profitable. Con-
sequently, best sellers tend to emphasize sensation over sophistication, a dynamic plot over the 
subtle unfolding of an intricate relationship and extraordinary situations and protagonists over 
the ordinary and mundane. It is certainly true that novels of this nature have a kind of addictive 
effect that stimulates a demand for more while only temporarily satisfying the appetite for 
fantasy. Marx describes this effect in the vitriolic terms that he characteristically reserves for the 
more iniquitous effects of capitalism: 
. , . the expansion of production and needs becomes the inventive and ever calculating 
slave of inhuman, refined, unnatural and imaginary appetites — for private property does 
not know how to transform crude need into human need. Its idealism is fantasy, caprice 
and infatuation. No eunuch flatters his despot more basely or uses more infamous means 
to revive his flagging capacity for pleasure, in order to win a surreptitious favour for himself, 
than does the eunuch of industry, the manufacturer to steal himself a silver penny or two 
or coax the gold from the pocket of his dearly beloved neighbour.131 
In accordance with the rule of mutual determination of production and consumption, the pro-
duction of debased or alienated literature thus sets up a vicious cycle of demand and supply 
that does nothing to develop or elevate the human powers of the participants in the relationship. 
For the production of alienated literature, like the production of unalienated literature, creates 
its own public: 
The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The 
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object of art - like every other product - creates a public which is sensitive to art and 
enjoys beauty. Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a sub-
ject.' ^^ 
Similarly, consumption determines production inasmuch as the object of production is only 
realized in consumption and also consumption forms the goal and purpose of production. Pro-
ducts are created to satisfy specific needs and are only realized in the satisfaction of these needs. 
This mutual determination of production and consumption has important implications for 
the ideological content of aesthetic products. Unalienated art which sets up a progressive dialec-
tic between the product and its consumption, will necessarily be innovative and experimental 
as it develops in tandem with the development of the powers of perception and appropriation 
of its public and strives to satisfy the new needs created in the act of consumption. With alie-
nated art, however, which does not develop or "humanize" man's powers, the interaction bet-
ween production and consumption is static. The result is that the art that most successfully 
escapes ingurgitation by capitalist forms of production questions reality, while the art that is 
most successfully produced according to capitalist formulae affirms reality. This fact was recog-
nized by Walter Benjamin in his essay "The Author as Producer" when he wrote that "the 
tendency of a work of literature can be politically correct only if it is also correct in the literary 
sense."^^^ He believed this because he believed that "this tendency may consist in a progressive 
development of literary technique, or in a regressive one."'^"^ A progressive technique involves 
a progressive political orientation, because capitalism seek to freeze the development of artistic 
technique in its tracks, and in its place attempts to reproduce existing products in a movement 
as it were, of lateral expansion. Artistic technique develops despite capitalism rather than because 
of it. In opposition to the development of artistic technique, capitalism seeks to turn artistic 
objects into commodities. It was this process that Brecht and Benjamin tried to warn intellec 
tuals about: the tendency of the capitalist apparatus of literary production to treat their work 
as commodities regardless of its concrete qualities. As long as they were not aware of this ten-
dency of capitalism, and of their own status as producers vis a vis the publishing apparatus, 
then they would only succeed in supplying that apparatus instead of changing it: 
. . . to supply a production apparatus without trying, within the limits of the possible, to 
change it, is a highly disputable activity even when the material supplied appears to be of 
a revolutionary nature. For we are confronted with the fact - of which there has been no 
shortage of proof in Germany over the last decade - that the bourgeois apparatus of pro-
duction and publication is capable of assimilating, indeed of propagating, an astonishing 
amount of revolutionary themes without ever seriously putting into question its own 
continued existence or that of the class which owns it. In any case this remains true so 
long as it is supplied by hacks, albeit revolutionary hacks.' ^^  
Benjamin's recognition of the bourgeois domination of the publishing apparatus anticipates 
Althusser's recognition that literature is one of the many Ideological State apparatuses. The 
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publishing apparatus is controlled by the bourgeoisie and serves its interests, namely the reten-
tion by that class of the control over the State power. 
Contrary to the usual formulation that regards high or serious literature as bourgeois as 
opposed to "popular" or trivial literature, in fact, ideologically speaking, the opposite is true. 
For in the bourgeois social formation, for which intellectually "its starting-point and its goal 
are always, if not always consciously, an apologia for the existing order of things or at least 
the proof of their immutability,"'^^ it is the so-called "popular" literature in which bourgeois 
reality is affirmed. Serious literature, on the other hand, which discourses upon the themes of 
change and development rather than the resolution of threats to the existing order and a return 
to the status quo, questions reality, casts doubt upon banal anodynes and is, in Arnold Kettle's 
words "revolutionary in the sense of evoking the revolutionary nature of reality. For reality is 
not something static, separate or cosy; it is something changing and challenging."' 
The mass production of literature along capitalist lines coincided, or rather was concomitant 
with, the rise of the publisher as distinct from the printer and bookseller as a middleman who 
coordinated the various elements of literary production on a mass scale; selection, manufacture 
and distribution. Hitherto, the author had entered into direct negotiation with the printer who 
was often also a bookseller in order to publish his work. The publisher as an independent entre-
preneur who took the risk of producing a book in return for the profits was a product of the 
second half of the eighteenth century. By the time that the publisher was fully established, he 
came to exercise enormous power over the whole domain of literary production, being respon-
sible not only for the success or failure of literary works, but also for their very existence. For 
the publisher takes the role of mediator between the writer and the public, exercising consider-
able influence over each party through his often subjective criteria of selection: 
Selection presupposes that the publisher - or his delegate — imagines a possible public and 
chooses from the mass of writing which is submitted to him the works best suited for that 
public. This sort of conjecture has a twofold and contradictory nature: on the one hand, it 
involves a judgement of fact as to what exactly the possible public desires, what it will 
buy; and on the other hand, a value judgement as to what should be the public's taste.' 
It is this individual with such powers of censorship that women were obliged to deal with 
when they entered the literary market. In some ways the existence of someone skilled in busi-
ness, impartially seeking a profit and capable of dealing with harsh, unsentimental financial 
transaction assisted women in their efforts to publish. Such business dealing would have been 
difficult to reconcile with the ideological notions of seemly behaviour for women. But at the 
same time, the material obstacles and ideological prejudices which impeded first-hand business 
dealing by women, coupled with the kind of isolation in which many rural writers like the 
Brontes lived in, would have made women writers more dependent on the goodwill of their 
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publishers. Their lack of business skills and the consequent dependence on their publishers was 
evident in, and reinforced by, the most comnnon method of payment for manuscripts: the 
outright sale of copyright. This meant tliat writers were under constant pressure to produce 
more work in a system that has all the marks of the reduction of literary work to wage labour. 
Showalter gives Dinah Mulock Craik as an example of the tone of supplication that women 
writers were forced to adopt when addressing their publishers: after writing three novels for 
which she sold the copyrights for £150 each, she wrote a fourth, Head of the Family which 
went into six editions, but for which she received nothing more; feeling cheated, she wrote to 
the publisher Edward Chapman in an apologetic tone, and seeking a gallant response to her 
professions of female weakness: 
Do you think that out of the profits of all that you could spare some addition to the one 
hundred and fifty pounds you gave me? - I know that it is not a right — and yet it seems 
hardly u n f a i r . . . I have not been able to work this winter - and may not be able to finish 
my fireside book for months — so that it becomes important to me to gather up all I can -
My head is tired out with having worked to [sic] hard when I was young — and now when 
I could get any amount of pay, I can't write.' ^^ 
It was only after they had gained some measure of financial security that women could adopt 
a more assertive tone and demand their rights from their publishers. 
However, the whole set of material and ideological circumstances surrounding the entry of 
women into the professional writing market served to make women much more dependent on 
their publishers than male writers; a dependency that left them open to the most profound in-
roads of capitalist publishing methods on their creative freedom. 
At the inception of the era of mass literature, capitalist publishing interests were fortui-
tously provided with a socially depressed group of educated or semi-educated writers for whom 
writing was often a desperate and sole source of income and who were thus ideal for manipulat-
ing into a dependent proletariat of literary production. Moreover, members of this group were 
often in the highly malleable position of being both grateful and half-incredulous for being able 
to publish at all, and guilty that they should do so, such were the ideological prejudices against 
women writers. All these factors, financial insecurity, lack of self-esteem, anxiety when they 
were engaging in an "unwomanly" activity and a long cultivated habit of deference to male 
authority and intellect tended to make women more readily acquiescent to the demands, advice 
and direction of publishers. Very few were in the position of George Eliot to maintain enough 
of an independent and high-minded stance to castigate the "silly novels by Lady Novelists". 
More typical of women writers' dependence on the goodwill of their male publishers is the 
example given in a letter by Mrs Elizabeth Lyn Linton, otherwise "unfemininely" capable and 
astute, to her publisher Blackwood on the occasion of his disapproval of a piece of her work: 
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I am so very sorry you did not like it! Could I not alter it to suit you? Indeed, indeed I am 
teachable and grateful for criticism, kindly (if not illnaturedly) bestowed, and have very 
little literary selfwill in the way of holding to my own against the advice of wiser and more 
experienced people . . . If I could interest such a man as yourself I could fear nothing and 
would gladly farm out my talent to his guidance and to his advantage as well as my own.' 
As a result of their equivocal entry into the profession women were in no position to assert 
an "authentic voice of their own". Even if they were not channelled by necessity or force of 
habit into churning out volume upon volume of domestic novels and sensational romances aimed 
specifically at a female public, women writers were still very conscious of the restricting 
standards of what it was suitable for a woman to write and for women to read. 
One of the inevitable tendencies accompanying mass production is the fragmentation and 
specialization of production and consumption. The expansion of literary production in the 
nineteenth century was no exception, with the development of genres and specialized publics. 
It was well known, to the point of becoming a rather jaded joke at their expense, that women 
had a propensity for indulging in romantic novels. The abundant leisure of the restricted and 
privatized middle class women and the widespread custom of women reading aloud to each other 
certainly point to the novel having a large female public. It has also been suggested that the 
tremendous growth of newspaper consumption would have reduced the amount of time avail-
able to men for the reading of fiction. The novelists were very much aware of this female 
audience and produced their work with this in mind. Some of the highest moral didacticism and 
lowest sentimentality in Dickens, for example, could only be aimed at women. 
But if women tended to be more realistic about male/female relationships, they neverthe-
less wholeheartedly endorsed the prevailing ideology of the family and the subordination of 
women, and except for a few notable exceptions never openly challenged the productive relations 
governing society or the sexual division of labour integral to those productive relations. The fact 
is that ever since the rise of the bourgeoisie and its liberal ideology there had been a small but 
persistent strain of feminism in English radical politics. The women associated with feminist 
issues often belonged to the same milieu as the women novelists, corresponded with them, and 
even at times were friends with them. But although the women writers were necessarily conscious 
of their almost unique position in having a rewarding profession and economic independence, 
seldom, if ever, did women writers associate themselves openly with feminist issues. No establish-
ed woman writer of any distinction came out in support of the suffrage movement, although 
several feminists turned to writing fiction during the course of the struggle. On the contrary, 
most women writers disapproved of female emancipation and some actively and vocally 
campaigned against it, Mrs Humphrey Ward in Rosalind Miles' words "proving so effective in the 
anti-suffrage league that she is personally credited with retarding the emancipation by some 
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years". Even the greatest of women writers remained tepid when it came to the 
"condi t ion of women" question. When quizzed on this subject by her friend and biographer 
Mrs Gaskell, Charfotte Bronte replied that there were "evils - deep-rooted in the foundation of 
the social system, which no efforts of ours can touch: of which we cannot complain: of which 
it is advisable not too often to t h i n k " . . ' G e o r g e Eliot, who contributed substantially to the 
foundation of Girton College, was nevertheless wary of publically endorsing feminist claims, 
painfully conscious as she was of her precarious position in society as an eminent novelist and 
intellectual and at the same time living with Lewes outside the bonds of matrimony. In support 
of Eliot's feminist views the passage from Daniel Deronda is often quoted where the Princess 
Halm-Eberstein exclaims bitterly to her son: 
You are not a woman. You may t ry - but you can never imagine what it is to have a man's 
force of genius in you, and yet to suffer the slavery of being a girl. To have a pattern cut out 
— "this is the Jewish woman: this is what you must be; this is what you are wanted for; a 
woman's heart must be of such a size and no larger, else it must be pressed small, like 
Chinese feet; her happiness is to be made as cakes are, by fixed receipt". ' ^ 
It is tempting to regard this statement as personal, but it must not be forgotten that this woman 
is a foreigner and an opera singer, both dubious qualities to the average middle class English 
reader. Moreover, she has total ly rejected her female role, rebelling against her father's 
authority, taking a career, giving away her only child, probably practising birth control and 
openly claiming " I had a right to be free. I had a right to seek my freedom from a bondage I 
h a t e d " . B u t , as she herself says, "every woman is supposed to have the same set of motives, 
or else to be a monster" and there is no doubt that she would indeed have been considered a 
monster by Eliot's readers. To underline the dangers of such an unorthodox approach to life, the 
Princess is portrayed as embittered and full of doubts as she nears the end of her life the victim 
of a painful terminal disease. The other women in the novel who rebel against the submissiveness 
and self-effacement of the traditional female role suffer equally harsh fates: Mrs Glasher, having 
left her husband for Grandcourt finds herself doomed to suffer for ever "the lot of a woman 
destitute of acknowledged social d igni ty" , while Gwendolen is left in reduced financial 
circumstances wi th an almost intolerable burden of guilt and separated from the man she has 
come to love and depend on. 
In the more typical novels of the same era adherence to the ideology of the family and 
patience and passivity was more overtly and didactically prescribed. At a time when Caroline 
Norton, whose alcoholic husband had prevented her from seeing her dying child, was 
campaigning to l imit the legal control of husbands over wives, and shocking stories of abuse 
suffered by wives at the hands of their husbands were circulating, many novels dealt wi th the 
themes of noble endurance, patience and martyrdom of oppressed wives and mothers. Mrs Henry 
I 
Wood, for example, wrote the best seller East Lynne (1862) in which a wife, frustrated, 
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disappointed and bored to death by her marriage runs away with a vile seducer, abandoning her 
husband and children. As a reward for this betrayal of her female role, she is abandoned by her 
lover, and loses her illegitimate child in a train crash where she is hideously disfigured. In penance 
she returns in disguise to her husband as a governess to her own children, to find that he has 
divorced her and married her worst enemy. To further rub salt into her wounds, she has to 
preside over the deathbed of her son without revealing her identity. Mrs Wood goes so far as to 
authorially intervene so as to make her message absolutely clear: t 
Lady-wife-mother! Should you ever be tempted to abandon your home, so will you 
awaken! Whatever trials may be the lot of your married life, though they may magnify 
themselves to your crushed spirit as beyond the endurance of woman to bear, resolve to 
bear them; fall down upon your knees and pray to be enabled to bear them.' 
So unanimously did women writers uphold the moral virtues of marriage and motherhood that 
it appears that it was almost a condition of women's entry into the domain of literary production 
that they should not question the ideologically prescribed reproductive role to which the capital-
ist relations of production required women to conform. It is almost as if they felt obliged to re-
double their efforts to promote the values of domesticity and self-denial the more that they 
themselves became independent of the home, and the duties of marriage and maternity the more 
they found the means of self-expression and self-determination. As Rosalind Miles exclaims with 
some chagrin: 
Again and again it is astonishing to realise the ardour with which these women embodied in 
their fiction the imposed social attitudes of the dominant sex. Women writers were more 
influential even than men in keeping other women in a carefully defined and rigidly 
restricted place. To borrow a metaphor from political philosophy, their colonisation by 
male supremacists was complete, they policed each other.' ^^ 
This almost universal conformity of women writers with the sexist values of their patriarchal 
society is not so astonishing when we consider, as we have done, the total configuration of the 
society and its relations of production within which they initiated their careers with such 
difficulty. As we have seen, the whole social experience of women, then as now, was designed to 
fit them for their role as reproducers — reproducers of labour power and reproducers of 
ideology. Their primary role, their destiny and their social definition was found in marriage and 
maternity. Literature, on the other hand, had been almost exclusively a male preserve, and to 
become a professional writer conflicted with all the values and expectations they had 
absorbed from birth. Furthermore, literature was a branch of artistic production, and all pro-
duction was dominated and controlled by men. What else could they do but adopt the values and 
ideology of the producers? As Elaine Showalter puts it: ". . . rather than confronting the values 
of their society, these women novelists were competing for its rewards. For women, as for other 
subcultures, literature became a symbol of achievement.'" 
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But if these women novelists of the nineteenth century had escaped their social destinies 
to become producers in one sense, in another they still conformed to their ideologically 
prescribed function: the reproduction of the ideology which maintained the relations of 
production. As we have seen, one of the most important functions delegated to women in the 
capitalist social formation is the mediation of ideology to her children in a way that reproduces 
the ideology of class — and sex— divided society through time from generation to generation. 
The reproduction of the governing ideology of a society is clearly an essential condition for 
maintaining the relations of production and thus the whole social formation of a society. Thus, 
while women escaped from the actual conditions of domesticity with its concomitant function of 
the material and ideological reproduction of labour power, they still retained the function of 
ideological reproduction. Instead of transmitting the ideology of the family and female 
subordination to children, in time of burgeoning feminism, they adopted the function of trans-
mitting ideology to their peers. Just as women who engaged in careers outside the home such as 
nursing or teaching found that their jobs were extensions of their domestic roles, so too did 
women writers find that their literary careers developed along lines already marked out by the 
very ideology they were obliged to reproduce. The extension of women's ideological role into 
literature was most evident in the religious novels which developed rapidly in the 1890s as 
women attempted to make use of the only avenue open to them to join the debate surrounding 
the Oxford Movement. Moral guardianship was also evident in the novels of social criticism 
which exposed the injustices of slavery, industrial exploitation and other social evils. The novels 
of Minna Kautsky and Margaret Harkness which achieved fame by being criticized by Engels 
typify this genre which women felt free to adopt because it conformed with their social role as 
nurturers and moral police. Women were able to champion all kinds of oppressed minorities in 
their novels — slaves, chartists, millhands in Yorkshire, revolutionaries in Europe, patriots in 
Italy, persecuted religious minorities — but they were never able to openly challenge their own 
oppressors. 
There were only two modes of expression open to women novelists, the archetypes of which 
were Charlotte Bronte and George Eliot. The former established a feminine tradition in 
literature which persists to this day, not only in English literature but also in American and 
French literature. She achieved this by casting the themes of a woman's passionate search for 
identity and its resolution in a dominating man in the old mould of the Gothic romance, and in 
doing so, she earmarked this form for women. George Eliot became the representative of the 
"honorary male" mode in which the writer adopts a masculine tone along with male standards 
and values. Both modes of course adopted and endorsed the ideological standards of the sex-
based social hierarchy, making it clear that women who broke the bounds of their proper sphere 
would inevitably suffer. 
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However, it is evident that many women writers did not accept the male values and 
ideology wholeheartedly, but instead found a number of ways to sublimate the rebellion they 
felt against the injustice, the confinement and the restrictions that were their lot as women. 
The anger and frustration they felt found an avenue of release in the protest fiction which I have 
already mentioned, as they profoundly identified with the situation of other oppressed and 
exploited groups. Virginia Woolf identified an undercurrent of suppressed anger in women's 
literature which in her opinion marred their work, feeling as she did that literary labour should 
be undertaken in an atmosphere of calm and in a mood of impassive detachment. As an example 
of the distortion suffered by a work in which this suppressed anger and frustration bubbles to 
the surface she quotes the passage in Jane Eyre where Jane longs to escape the restrictions of her 
quiet secluded life as a country governess so that she could travel, visit the towns, meet people 
and enrich her life: 
Who blames me? Many, no doubt, and I shall be called discontented. 1 could not help it: 
the restlessness was in my nature; it agitated me to pain sometimes. . . 
It is vain to say human beings ought to be satisfied with tranquility: they must have 
action; and they will make it if they cannot find it. Millions are condemned to a stiller doom 
than mine, and millions are in silent revolt against their lot. Nobody knows how many 
rebellions besides political rebellions ferment in the masses of life which earth. Women are 
supposed to be very calm generally: but women feel just as men feel; they need exercise for 
their faculties and a field for their efforts as much as their brothers do; they suffer from too 
rigid a restraint, too absolute a stagnation, precisely as men would suffer; and it is narrow-
minded in their more privileged fellow-creatures to say that they ought to confine them-
selves to making puddings and knitting stockings, to playing on the piano and embroidering 
bags. It is thoughtless to condemn them, or laugh at them if they seek to do more or learn 
more than custom has pronounced necessary for their sex.^ "*® 
Woolf regards this passage as a defect which deforms and twists her book and prevents her from 
getting "her genius expressed whole and entire". Nowadays we would see this current of 
suppressed anger as a positive factor which generates the electrifying tension, the pace and drama 
which compelled the reader of Bronte's original publishers Smith and Elder to read through he 
manuscript in one day. For the whole story of Jane Eyre is the story of Jane's resistance to 
various forms of male tyranny; resistance against the tyranny of John Reed at Gateshead Hall, 
against the brutal repression of her individuality by Mr Brocklehurst at Lowood, the ascetic 
denial of her sexuality at St John Rivers and against sexual domination of Rochester. Woolf 
believed that Jane Eyre like many other wonien's novels had "a flaw in the centre that had rotted 
them" and that this was because Bronte "had altered her values in deference to the opinion of 
o t h e r s " I believe, to the contrary, that Jane Eyre achieved greatness precisely to the extent 
that Bronte had not "altered her values in deference to the opinions of others". She was able to 
express her anger at the oppression she suffered, albeit in an oblique and metaphorical way, and 
objectify her subjectivity in the work so that her essential humanity was communicated to others 
not only of her own generation but also of succeeding generations. She was able to do this partly 
because she was relatively free from all the ideological and material conditions which really did 
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succeed in "deforming and twisting" women's novels. The extent to which Jane Eyre, which 
after all was founded on the rather hoary form of the traditional Gothic romance, and 
which has since inspired innumerable banal chronicles of governesses and rich, rugged, paternal 
patricians, was atypical is to be seen in the reception it received at the time of its publication. 
As Ellen Moers writes: 
Jane Eyre was read as a dangerous and angry book in its own time, a woman's book in the 
radical sense of the term; "we do not hesitate to say," said the Quarterly Review in 1848, 
"that the tone of mind and thought which has overthrown authority and violated every 
code human and divine abroad, and fostered Chartism and rebellion at home, is the same 
which has also written Jane Eyre".' ^ ° 
It is perhaps a recognition of the relatively unalloyed realization of woman's humanity in this 
novel that it has become one of the paragons of women's writing all over the western world. 
The restrictions on women's freedom to express themselves completely and honestly were 
numerous and complex. We have examined some of them. The material and ideological obstacles 
to publication; the tendency for women to be reduced out of necessity to artistic wage-
labouring, having nothing else to sell but their labour; the ideology which makes professional 
artistic production an alien activity for women. These restrictions were both internal and ex-
ternal. Virginia Woqlf identified one source of restriction as "The perpetual admonitions of the 
eternal pedagogue" . . . 
. . . that persistent voice, now grumbling, now patronizing, now domineering, nov\/grieved, 
now shocked, now angry, now avuncular, that voice which cannot let women alone, but 
must be at them, like some too conscientious governess, adjuring them, like Sir Egerton 
Brydges, to be refined; dragging even into the criticism of poetry criticism of sex; admon-
ishing them, if they be good and win, as I suppose, some shiny prize, to keep within certain 
limits which the gentleman in question thinks suitable.' ^' 
The internal counterpart of "the eternal pedagogue" was "the Angel in the House", Woolf's 
term for the internalised ideology that insisted that women should write in a feminine way, 
charming, sympathetic, refined, and never crude, forthright or improper. It was that property in 
women's conditioning that, to use a loaded term, emasculated their writing, which prohibited 
them for reasons of propriety from frankly talking about their feelings, from expressing 
passionate but unseemly desires, from discussing their bodies or sex or from being critical of men 
in general: 
This I believe to be a very common experience with women writers — they are impeded by 
the extreme conventionality of the other sex. For though men sensibly allow themselves 
great freedom in these respects, I doubt that they can realise or control the extreme severity 
with which they condemn such freedom in women.' ^ ^ 
This attitude persists even now for what else but the frisson produced by an awareness of the 
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sex could have been responsible for the success of novels like Erica Jong's Fear of Flying'•Nh\ch 
is neither a particularly good novel nor sexually frank by nnale standards, 
f » 
One way in which women were able, at least in part, to get around these ideological 
restrictions was to make use of a male persona. Not only did authors adopt male psuedonyms, 
and there is evidence that this stratagem was not only practised for reasons of personal conceal-
ment or in the hope of impartial criticism, but that it af fected the whole tone and content of the 
work; they also transmuted their "unfeminine" desires, feelings, behaviour, etc. into male 
persona. By projecting themselves into their male characters, women writers were able, on the 
grounds of realism, to give expression to a far wider range of human behavioural possibilities. 
It is a device which is still current among women writers and it is certainly an eloquent comment 
on a society in which the sex-based division of labour and ideologically determined roles 
prohibits women from realising the full range of their human potential in their female characters. 
A case in point is Simone de Beauvoir's Les Mandarins, in which she felt it necessary to split the 
fictional representation of her own personality (many of de Beauvoir's characters are heavily 
autobiographical) into a male part and a female part. Even though she herself is a writer, she felt 
it inappropriate to portray a fictional writer as a woman: 
Peignant un e'crivain, je desirais que le lecteur vTt en lui un semblable et non une bete 
curieuse; mais beaucoup plus qu'un homme, une femme qui a pour vocation et pour metier 
d'e'crire est une exception. (Ce mot n'est synonyme ni de monstre, ni de merveille; je le 
prends dans un sens statistique.) Je n'ai done pas confie mon stylo a Anne mais a Henri' ^ ^ 
Even using this device, however, women were still inhibited when it came to writing frankly 
about sexual experience or expressing openly feminist views. To take the example of de Beauvoir, 
again, there is only one explicit sexual scene in her entire fictional work, occurring in Les 
Mandarins (this scene was almost completely expurgated in the English translation). Sartre, on 
the other hand, whose values, social milieu, formative intellectual experience and influences, 
and indeed whose whole adult life have been practically identical with those of de Beauvoir, 
evinces none of these same inhibitions in his fiction. 
The fact that we can use a writer like Simone de Beauvoir to illustrate many of the 
obstacles that women have to face to write freely and honestly is evidence of the enduring nature 
of these obstacles; they are not only a nineteenth century British phenomenon, but are still 
current and in many other countries besides. Simone de Beauvoir is herself an anomaly, as she 
readily admits, in that she is one of the very few women in France who are able to live solely on 
the proceeds of their writing. The total number of professional writers in France is itself minimal, 
and although there are no figures, the proportion of professional women authors must be even 
smaller: of the 9,000 who publish regularly in that country, only 600 "beneficient du statut 
d'e'crivain professionel et ont droit aux avantages sociaux qu'il prouve,"'^'* and only 500 live 
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solely by their pens (1977 figures). Novelists would make up an even smaller number since of 
the 7,600 new ti t les published annual ly, representing the work of between 6,000 and 6,500 
authors, on ly between 1,500 and 2,000 are novels, and this figure has been decreasing each 
year. This is in a count ry where the propor t ion of the populat ion who read books at all is com-
paratively high, 43%, compared w i th Canada (40%) and Australia (35%), for instance; in Great 
Britain the figure is 55%. France is therefore a favourable microcosm of the book publishing 
business, and it is wo r th examining the situation in that count ry in some detail as an i l lustration 
of the problems that face all women wri ters to-day. 
One informat ive indicator of the situation of the contemporary woman wri ter in France is 
the awarding of l i terary prizes. These prizes are important to authors because the winning of 
them is a great assistance to becoming f inancially independent. This is not so because of the 
prize money involved (the sum is o f ten nominal: 5,000F for the Prix Femina; 20,000F for the 
Grand Prix National des Lettres), but because a prize-winning novel assures the author of a 
best-selling edit ion the fo l lowing year. Where an addit ion of 100,000 represents a best seller, 
the winner of the Goncourt can expect an edit ion of 120,000 to 500,000; the Femina 80,000 
to 180,000; the Renaudot 60,000 to 100,000; and the Prix Interallie 100,000. In 1973, the 
Goncourt winner was assured an edi t ion of 460,000 w i th half a dozen translations and royalties 
of between 600,000 and 1,000,000 francs. Simone de Beauvoir's winning of the Goncourt in 
1954 for Les IVIandarins meant that she could buy a car and a f lat and live in comfortable, though 
by no means extravagant circumstances for the rest of her life. But again, de Beauvoir's case is 
singular: the Prix Goncourt had been awarded annually since 1903 (with a single omission in 
1940), bu t i t had only been awarded to one woman before her (Beatrix Beck in 1952). Since 
then, on ly one other woman has been awarded the Goncourt (Anna Langfus in 1962). The other 
prizes show a similar predominance of male winners: The Prix Albert-Londres has been awarded 
cont inual ly since 1933, but never to a woman; the Grand Prix National des Lettres has been 
run since 1951, but only in 1975 was it won by a woman, Marguerite Yourcenar; the Prix 
Theophraste-Renaudot has been awarded 52 times and only four of these to women. Perhaps 
most significant is the case of the prestigious Prix Fe'mina which was founded in 1904 by the 
directors of the review "V ie Heureuse" (later succeeded by "Femina" ) , "pour encourager les 
lettres et rendre plus etroites les relations de confraternite entre les femmes des lettres"; this 
prize was on ly won by women 21 times in its entire history. 
The lack of representation by women writers among the literary prize-winners may be 
in part due to the fact that , w i t h the exception of the Fe'mina, there has been only one woman 
elected to the juries who decide the prize-winning novel (Francoise Mallet-Joris was elected to 
the Goncour t ju ry in 1970); but it is more l ikely that the dominance of men in this domain 
is the concrete result of all the impediments that women face in thier literary careers. 
78 
Simone de Beauvoir is also exceptional in that she had an education and a job. She was one 
of on ly 10% or so of women of her generation who were in a posit ion to undertake higher 
education. More signif icantly, perhaps, is the fact that she remained unmarried, and established 
a liaison w i t h a man who encouraged rather than hindered her wr i t ing and did not restrict her 
freedom: of her generation (those born between 1906 and 1910) 90.5% of women married 
before the age of f i f t y . The fact tha t she could work as a lycee teacher also put her in a fortunate, 
but singular posit ion for a woman wr i ter . As we have seen, the number of ful l - t ime novelists is 
very small, and the financial returns for published works nowadays rarely represent a comfortable 
standard of living. A n author's income can be calculated fair ly accurately, and an examination of 
the figures show that whi le the income of publishing houses has increased by a th i rd in the four 
years f r o m 1970, authors' income in France is often below the min imum wage. Unless an author 
sells the copyr ight of his work out r igh t , he can expect royalties on sales of 3% to 6% on paper-
back and 5% t o 20% on bound books. The percentage is of ten progressive, and an established 
author can receive 10% on the f irst 6,000 copies, 12% f rom 6,000 to 20,000, and 15% above 
that ; 20% is a very rare figure. Paperbacks sell on average at 3F a copy, hardbacks at 10F. How-
ever, most l i terary works are only published in editions of 5,200 or less; 24% f rom 6,000 to 
12,000, 8% f rom 12,000 to 18,000; 6.5% f rom 18,000 to 24,000, 5% f rom 24,000 to 36,000 
and 7.5% above 36,000. Professional wr i t ing is thus a livelihood which hardly guarantees a 
comfortable life-style; as the wri ters of Quid 1977 put i t : 
Un romancier regulier (ils sont rares) qui vendrait tous les ans un roman a 30.000 ex (en 
e'dition brochee a 10F) s'assurait un revenu d'ouvrier qualif ie. Que son roman ne tire qu'a 
10.000 et son revenu descendra au-dessous du SMIG . . ^ ^ 
Robert Escarpit described the si tuat ion more succinctly: "a young novelist who takes his manu-
script to a publisher w i th the idea of making ten thousand francs f rom the sale of his work has 
less chance of making that amount than if he bought the tenth part of a t icket in the National 
L o t t e r y . " ' 5 6 
The poor f inancial returns for wr i t ing ensure that most writers have to have other sources 
of income. A survey quoted by Escarpit published by L'Express, November 27, 1954, dealing 
w i th 128 novels published that year showed that ; 41% were wr i t ten by 'men of letters', 16% 
by professors, 10% by lawyers, 7% by civil servants, 5% by engineers and 2% by d o c t o r s . ' " 
As we have seen, i t is f rom these very positions which al low a social, economic and intellectual 
life compatible w i t h wr i t ing, that women are excluded. It is for this reason that women who 
wish to make a career out of wr i t ing are of ten forced to tu rn to . . . 
. . . the vast domain of the al imentary l iterature of the "potbo i lers" , as the English say. 
That k ind of work may have its moments of nob i l i ty , especially in the detective novel 
and the adventure novel; it also has its moments of ugliness. Organized in factories, pot-
boilers can provide comfortable incomes to those mdndQers of litGrsturs, of w h o m 
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Alexander Dumas was an example, but who flourish today more than ever. It is here that 
the proletariat of the pen, slave labourers, find work in writing what others sign or what 
the merchants of this sub-literature bring out under pink, candy-coated pseudonyms. 
Nine-tenths of the population satisfy their reading hunger with such novels.' ^ ^ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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In this thesis I have tried to demonstrate how women's writing cannot be meaningfully 
considered apart from the social, economic and ideological circumstance of its authors. I have 
tried to show how the capitalist system of production allocates women a role in the social for-
mation that is essential to the reproduction of the human means and relations of that produc-
tive system. The sexual division of labour uninvolved in this system is maintained and reproduced 
by various ideological apparatuses, the most important being the family and the school, ulti-
mately guaranteed by the repressive apparatus of the State. It is the same ideology that prescribes 
women's reproductive and powerless role in the capitalist social formation that determines their 
entry into the literary market, firstly by creating an array of material and ideological obstacles 
to that entry, and secondly by ensuring that their literary work accords with the ideology of the 
ruling class which controls the means of literary production. 
Understanding these social circumstances conditioning women's writing, we are in a better 
position to understand why the works of female authors of the past have little to offer contem-
porary feminists in the way of positive role models, and why so many of them appear to have 
gone over to the other side as it were. It was simply a matter of conforming to the ideology of 
the system, or suffering artistic death. Often feminists turn to these authors in the hope that, 
because they have risen above, or at least attained a different perspective on the narrow and 
stultifying destiny of the average woman, women writers of the past will have something positive 
to say about the condition of women: just as often this quest is disappointed. Women writers 
who seem clearly to offer feminist themes and positive heroines in their works, like Christina 
Stead, for example, are found to reject feminism with an unexpected acerbity. Simone de 
Beauvoir only declared herself a feminist over a decade after the publication of Le Deuxieme 
Sexe. 
It is only in the last five years or so that there has seemed to be a positive chance that 
women's writing can be liberated from the ideological tyranny of the male ruling class. The 
setting up of women's presses and publishing houses such as Virago in London, L'editions des 
femmes in Paris, the Feminist Press in New York, Daughters Inc. in Vermont and the Shameless 
Hussy Press in California, has meant that women have some control over the means of literary 
production, and have an ideological apparatus of their own. 
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A P P E N D I X 
Figures obtained from The Role of Women in the Economy: a Summary based on ten National 
Reports by Martha Darling for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Paris, 1975. 
90 
Table 1: T H E G R O W T H I N W O M E N ' S L A B O U R F O R C E P A R T I C I P A T I O N , 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 7 2 
COUNTRY 
WORKING WOMEN ® AS % OF A L L WOMEN 
YEAR % YEAR % YEAR % 
Australia 1954 26.3 1961 28.9 1971 37.1 
Belgium 1950 24.0 1960 23.2 1971 26.1 
Canada 1950 23.2 1960 27.9 1972 37.1 
Denmark - — 1967 49.1 1972 53.5 
Finland 1960 53.5 1960 48.4 1970 48.8 
France 1954 38.4 1962 36.2 1973 48.4 
Italy — — 1962 24.1 1971 19.2 
Japan 1955 56.7 1960 54.5 1970 49.9 
Sweden 1950 33.6 1965 48.7 1973 55.2 
United States 1950 33.9 1960 37.8 1972 43.8 
a. Includes unpaid family helpers working 15 hours per week or more. 
SOURCES: National reports and supplements; International Labour Office, 1971 Year Book of Laobur Statistics. 
Table 2: P R O P O R T I O N O F L A B O U R F O R C E W O R K I N G P A R T - T I M E (LESS T H A N 3 5 H O U R S PER W E E K ) , 
B Y S E X ( I N PER C E N T ) 
WOMEN MEN 
T O T A L OF WHOM 
MARRIED 
WOMEN 
Australia (1973) 27.1 36.6 3.2 
Canada (1962) 18.1 — 3.8 
(1972) 24.9 _ 6.2 
Denmark (1972) 43.0 — 7.0 
France (1971) 13.2® _ 1.7 
Japan (1960) 8.9 — 5.1 
(1971) 13.1 — 4.3 
Sweden (1973) 37.0 49.0 3.4 
United States (1967) 26.1 — 9.2 
(1972) 28.7 — 10.3 
a. Less than 30 hours per week. 
Table 3: P E R C E N T A G E O F F E M A L E S I N H I G H E R E D U C A T I O N A R O U N D 1950 , 1 9 6 5 A N D 1972 
COUNTRY 
AROUND 1950 AROUND 1965 AROUND 1972 
YEAR % YEAR % YEAR % 
Australia 1955 28 1965 34 1971 36.2 
Belgium 1952 26 1966 25® 1971 30® 
Canada — — 1968 28 1972 39.7 
Denmark 1950 24 1965 35 - -
Finland 1952 39 1965 48 1971 47.2 
France 1955 32 1965 39 1971 43.4 
Italy 1950 25 1964 32 — -
Japan 1950 10 1965 24 1972 29.6 
Sweden 1951 29 1962 38 1972 36.6 
United States 1950 32 1965 39 1972 42.0 
a. University only. 
SOURCES: - Educational Expansion in OECD Countries since 1950 (Background Report No.1), OECD 1970, p.35. 
— National Reports and Supplements. 
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Table 4: PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN AND MEN CONTINUING TO HIGHER EDUCATION, 1965 
COUIMTRY 
A L L INSTITUTIONS UNIVERSITY COMPLETING UNIVERSITY 
MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN 
Belgium 25.7 17.7 13.3 5.9 7.5 2.3 
Canada — — — — 18.4 9.3 
Denmark 18.8 12.0 13.7 6.4 4.5 0.9 
Finland — — 10.0 10.2 
Frnace — — 12.2 11.0 4.2 
Italy 18.5 11.0 18.1 10.5 4.6 2.6 
Japan 23.6 11.6 21.8 4.6 16.3 3.2 
Sweden 16.0 14.3 14.3 10.6 7.9 4.0 
United States 44.0 33.5 31.2 24.9 26.5 18.1 
SOURCE: Analytical Report on the Development of Higher Education 1950-1967, OECD, ED(70)3, Tables 11-9 and V-3. 
Table 5: RATES OF SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETION AND ENTRY INTO UNIVERSITY 
COUNTRY 
WOMEN AS % OF 
MEN COMPLETING 
SECONDARY SCHOOL 
WOMEN A S % O F 
MEN CONTINUING 
TO UNIVERSITY 
Belgium 71.9 57.8 
Denmark 84.7 66.1 
Finland 135.1 73.8 
France 101.6 88.4 
Italy® 74.3 80.2 
Japan 95.9 23.1 
Sweden 103.6 70.6 
United States 104.9 75.8 
a. Long secondary education and all institutions of higher education. 
SOURCE: Analytical Report on the Development of Higher Education 1950-1967, OECD, ED(70)3, Table 111-11. 
Table 6: WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF ENROLMENTS IN VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL 
SECONDARY SCHOOL COURSES 
COUNTRY 
BUSINESS A N D 
COMMERCIAL 
PERSONAL 
SERVICES 
MEDICAL AND 
COMMUNITY 
SERVICES 
INDUSTRIAL AND 
TECHNICAL 
A L L 
COURSES 
Canada (1970) 82.4 81.9 78.8 9.6 51.9 
Finland (1967) 66.4 — 92.0 14.1 41.8 
France (1971) 95.0 — 80.0 5.0 46.5 
Japan (1971) 63.8 — 90.0 2.9 37.3 
United States (1967) 79.3 80 94.6 2.3 66.5 
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Table 7: WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF ENROLMENTS IN UNIVERSITY COURSES, 1965 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 5 6 
WOMEN AS % OF 
UNIVERSITY 
STUDENTS 
Australia® 29.9 1.3 23.1 64.0 1.7 20.5 35.1 
Belgium 27.6 0.9 22.7 45.5 18.8 17.2 25.0 
Canada 17.9 0.9 45.5 40.4 6.1 19.1 28.0 
Denmark 22.3 4.2 31.3 50.8 30.0 6.1 36.1 
Finland 36.2 37.8 75.5 26.1 43.3 49.1 
France 31.0 6.9' ' 34.9 65.0 28.0 — 41.3 
Italy 31.3 0.5 17.0 74.0 15.0 15.8 35.5 
Japan 12.4 0.4 35.1 42.8 — 5.7 20.0 
Sweden 25.0 5.9 26.4 63.0 20.3 38.3 35.0 
United States 26.1 0.4 43.9 49.7 3.4 24.0 39.0 
a. SOURCE: Australian National Report, 1971 data. 
b. France supplennent, 1971-2 data. 
SOURCE: Analytical Report on the Development of Higher Education 1950-1967, OECD, ED(70)3, Table I V - 1 3 . 
1. Pure Science 
2. Technology (includes engineering) 
3. Medical sciences 
4. Humanities 
5. Law 
6. Social science 
Table 8: PROPORTION OF WORKING WOMEN AND MEN IN MANAGERIAL LEVEL JOBS 
Table 9: PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIbS 
(Women as a percentage of ail persons in category) 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
WOMEN AS % 
OF T O T A L 
Australia (1971) 42.3 12.0 48.3 63.8 13.7 13.1 15.5 62.7 31.6 
Belgium (1961) 42.2 8.3 51.5 33.9 17.5 4.5 17.8 15.9 64.3 27.0 
Canada (1972) 41.2 14.3 38.8 72.0 14.9 15.3 8.8 14.1 59.1 33.6 
Denmark (1965) 50.8 14.4 42.7 62.9 18.3 9.5 26.9 17.0 77.6 38.4 
Finland (1970) _ 4.5 63.3 62.2 — 23.0 15.6 33.2 63.1 — 
France (1968) 20.1 12.8 57.8 60.8 14.0 12.0 20.4 37.9 79.1 34.9 
Japan (1972) 41.8 5.2 31.7 46.8 — 12.4 31.9 20.0 53.1 32.4 
Sweden (1973) 45.9 10.0 47.5 78.8 — — 15.2 22.2 79.1 40.9 
United States (1970) 39.9 16.6 38.6 73.6 5.0 31.5 8.4 9.5 60.0 38.0 
SOURCE: National reports and supplements: International Labour Office, 1971 Year Book of Labour Statistics. 
1. Professional and technical 
2. Managerial and administrative 
3. Sales workers, commerce 
4. Clerical, off ice workers 
5. Craftsmen, artisans 
6. Operatives, transport 
7. Manual workers 
8. Agricultural workers 
9. Personal services, recreation 
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T a b l e 10: R E P R E S E N T A T I O N O F W O M E N I N H I G H S T A T U S O C C U P A T I O N S 
( W o m e n as a pe rcen tage o f all persons in o c c u p a t i o n 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Canada (1971) — _ — _ — _ — _ — _ 
Finland (1968) 21.5 2.0 3.2 0.5 3.5 — 8.9® — 14.0 4.5 
Frnce (1968) 1.6 4.4 2.0 0.5 — 18.0^ 20.0 20.0 
Japan (1970) 2.8 0.8 1.0 - - — 2.5 9.5 1.2 17.7 4.8 
Sweden (1971) 14.0 15.0 2.8 — 12.0 — — 10.1 
United States (1971) 2.4 4.3 2.0 0.2 4.6 3.0'' 7.1 15.3 22.0 16.6 
a. Chief doctors only. b. Lawyers only. 
1. Elected off ice — National Parliament 6. 
2. Elected off ice — local and regional levels 7. 
3. High civil servants 8. 
4. Corporate management: officers and board members 9. 
5. Labour union leaders: officers and board members 10. 
Lawyers and judges 
Physicians 
Primary and secondary school principals 
Academic staff in higher education 
Managerial level jobs 
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